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I. Introduction
In 1985, in a book entitled World Politics and International Law,
Francis Boyle delivered a caustic critique of the work of international
legal scholars: "contemporary public international lawyers have devel-
oped a highly formalistic and exclusively technical international legal
positivist approach to international relations." Wholly concerned with
questions of legality, they have neglected both "the great issues of Ameri-
can foreign policy and world affairs" and the theoretical study of interna-
tional relations.'
In terms of theory, at least, Boyle's criticism is exaggerated. Interna-
tional law ("IL") scholarship includes much theoretical work: the mas-
sive edifice of the New Haven School, other sociological theory,
2
emerging Critical Legal Studies theory, 3 and so on.4 Still, any perusal of
IL casebooks, listings of newly published articles, or similar evidence will
demonstrate that, overall, the discipline has fallen behind other fields of
law in developing an analytical approach informed by social science.
Consider, for example, the major American IL casebooks.5 These works
appear to be pursuing a rather narrow mission-the description of insti-
tutions and doctrine. They devote relatively little space to such funda-
mental issues as the functions that international rules and institutions
perform for states, the allocative and distributional consequences of par-
ticular rules, and the circumstances under which desirable rules can be
created. When issues like these are discussed, it is only briefly and at a
1. F. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1985); see also id. at 58-
60.
2. See, e.g., Stone, A Sociological Perspective on International Law, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND
THEORY 263 (R. Macdonald & D. Johnston eds. 1983) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
3. See, e.g., Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house
of Language, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327 (1985); Tarullo, Logic, Myth, and the International
Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 533 (1985); Kennedy, Theses About International Law
Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353 (1980).
4. For other examples, see STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 2.
5. Casebooks are not the most sophisticated scholarship in the discipline, of course, but
they are central to teaching, important tools of reference, and suggestive of how the discipline
defines itself. I have reviewed most of the major casebooks, albeit not systematically. The
casebook representing the New Haven School-M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COM-
MUNITY (1981)-draws more on theory than its competitors, and that theory is in some ways
inconsistent with modem international relations (IR) theory. I will not, however, undertake a
comparison of the two theories here. For criticism of the New Haven School as a vehicle for
uniting IL and IR scholarship, see F. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 61-67. I will refer in this section
to L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW] as representative
of the standard casebooks.
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high level of generality.6 As a result, the casebooks have no need to draw
on explicit theoretical approaches. Especially noteworthy is the minimal
influence of economics; economic analysis, and the rational choice ap-
proach of which it is a part, have led to a creative upheaval in most fields
of legal study, thoroughly permeating both teaching and scholarship, but
they have largely been shunned by IL scholars.
Noteworthy too-and not unrelated-is the estrangement between IL
and the most closely related social science discipline, international rela-
tions ("IR"). With a few notable exceptions, 7 scholars in these two fields
have long proceeded on separate tracks.8 They have for the most part
worked independently, published in different journals, attended different
conferences, and cited each other's work only to a very limited degree.
Over time, scholars in each field have become unfamiliar with the other's
research agenda, making cooperation increasingly difficult. 9
For IR scholars, the problem has not been mere unfamiliarity, but an
aversion to the legalistic approach identified by Boyle: "[the] tradition of
positive international law ... [is] regarded with something approaching
contempt by students of international politics .... ",i IR scholarship,
though, has also contributed to the "unwarranted schism."' 1 Realism,
the dominant IR theory for over two thousand years, has had little to say
to students of international law. 12 Classical Realists see a world of states
6. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 21 (International law
serves policies of "order and stability, peace, independence, justice, [and] welfare.") (quoting
L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND POLICY 10 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter L.
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE]) ("International law is law like other-law, promoting or-
der, guiding, restraining, regulating behavior.") (citing RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, introductory note to pt. I, ch.1). The
problem of compliance, which combines supply and demand elements, is most often discussed
analytically, but again the analysis is quite general. See id. at 19 ("Reciprocity of obligations
may function... to encourage compliance."); see also id. at 20-23.
7. See, e.g., F. BOYLE, supra note 1; M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961).
8. Early in the century, IR scholars were much concerned with international law and or-
ganization, particularly in connection with the League of Nations. See J. DOUGHERTY & R.
PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2-4 (2d ed.
1981).
9. For a similar description of the estrangement between the law and society and the law
and economics inovements, see Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
10. Bull, Recapturing the Just Warfor Political Theory, 31 WORLD POL. 588, 588 (1979);
cf. F. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 1-7; Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,
40 INT'L ORG. 599, 639-40 (1986) (most scholarly literature on human rights is legalistic; even
the best is predominantly descriptive and positivistic, and ignores politics).
11. F. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 60.
12. See id. at 3-16; Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 503 (A. Finifter ed. 1983) [hereinafter
Keohane, Theory]. Realism is often traced to THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (T.
Wick rev. ed. 1981) (c. 400 B.C.).
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obsessed with their power vis-A-vis other states. 13 International rules and
institutions are mere window-dressing: their creation and decline, and
the degree to which states respect them, depend solely on the current
power realities. I4 IL scholars have seen little point in a dialogue with
adherents of this view.
15
Some postwar Realists, however, have come to acknowledge the rele-
vance of international cooperation and have sought a better theoretical
understanding of international rules and institutions.16 One particularly
important body of theory, emerging only in the 1980s, focuses on norma-
tive orders called "international regimes." The development of regime
theory and related theories of international cooperation-what I call
modern IR theory--offers a long-overdue opportunity to re-integrate IL
and IR.
This opportunity does not depend on the "regime" concept itself. The
most widely accepted definition of a "regime" is that put forward by Ste-
phen Krasner: regimes are sets of "implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations."'17 Although this defi-
13. See Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 508.
14. See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 190-91 (1982) [hereinafter Krasner, Structural Causes]. Inter-
national rules may be used, however, as expost rationalizations for actions taken for reasons of
power. See F. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 7-8.
15. Henkin refers to such a dialogue as a dialogue de sourds. See L. HENKIN, How NA-
TIONS BEHAVE, supra note 6, at 2-4.
16. See R. McKINLEY & R. LITTLE, GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND WORLD ORDER 82-87
(1986); Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 530. Other IL scholars have followed more "Uto-
pian" theories, such as the functionalist approach, which holds that international interdepen-
dence and transnational contacts through international organizations will gradually overcome
state conflict. See, eg., D. MITRANY, THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS (1975). For
brief discussions, see F. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 5-7; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: CO-
OPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 7-9, 66 (1984) [hereinafter
R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]. Modem IR theory, as described in this article, is in a real
sense a synthesis of Realism and the functionalist approach, the two principal lines of postwar
theory.
17. Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 14, at 186. Krasner's definition continues:
"Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior de-
fined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing
collective choice." Id. Neither "principles" nor "norms" necessarily implies a moral element;
the principles of a regime can simply be taken to define its purposes. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 57-58. Regimes, then, are not necessarily "good," though they
are often discussed as if they were. See id. at 72-73; Strange, Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of
Regime Analysis, 36 INT'L ORG. 479, 487-88 (1982) [hereinafter Strange, Cavel].
This definition seems unnecessarily complex, especially since the boundaries between its four
elements are quite arbitrary. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 59.
There will, however, often be value in maintaining the distinction between the principles and
norms of a regime and its specific rules and procedures. By identifying the underlying princi-




nition has been heuristically valuable, it lacks precision: it does not re-
ally answer the question, "How do we know a regime when we see
one?" 18 To complicate matters further, the definition does not reflect a
consensus: theorists have advanced both broader and narrower concep-
tions of a regime. 19 None of the prevailing definitions, moreover, is con-
gruent with the usual descriptive categories of IL, such as customary
rules, conventional rules and international organizations.20 Debate over
the proper definition of "regime" and its relation to IL seems likely to be
sterile, and will not be pursued here. I will use the term in this article,
but only in a non-technical sense to refer to relatively complex normative
orders.
The opportunity to integrate IL and IR stems, rather, from the analyt-
ical approaches, insights and techniques of modem IR theory, which can
illuminating example, see generally Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (1982).
18. See Haggard & Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491, 493-
95 (1987). For additional criticism, see Strange, Cave!, supra note 17, at 484-86; Kratochwil,
The Force of Prescriptions, 38 INT'L ORG. 685 (1984).
19. See Haggard & Simmons, supra note 18, at 493-96. Narrow regime definitions empha-
size formality or institutionalization. See Strange, Cavel, supra note 17, at 485; Stein, Coordi-
nation and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299, 300 (1982)
[hereinafter Stein, Collaboration]; Keohane, The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in
International Economic Regimes, 1967-77, in CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 131,
132-33 (0. Holsti, M. Siverson & A. George eds. 1980) [hereinafter, Keohane, Theory of Hege-
monic Stability].
Broader conceptions have also been advanced. Puchala and Hopkins, for example, assert
that regimes "exist primarily as participants' understandings, expectations or convictions
about legitimate, appropriate or moral behavior," and conclude that "a regime exists in every
substantive issue-area in international relations where there is discernibly patterned behavior."
Puchala & Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis, 36 INT'L ORG.
245, 246-47 (1982). For a similar conception, see Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall
of International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 277, 277-81 (1982) [hereinafter Young, Regime Dy-
namics]; 0. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(1982). Such definitions include a great deal of what Stein calls "normal international poli-
ties." Stein, Collaboration, supra, at 300; see also id. at 300 n.l.
"Cognitive" theorists take a very different approach. These scholars assert that "coopera-
tion cannot be completely explained without reference to ideology, the values of actors, the
beliefs they hold about the interdependence of issues, and the knowledge available to them
about how they can realize specific goals." Haggard & Simmons, supra note 18, at 509-10.
National interests, structural constraints, and desirable regimes must be understood in terms of
"historically condiioned, interpretive frameworks." Id. at 499. The leading cognitive theorist
is Ernst Haas. See Haas, Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdepen-
dence and the Construction of International Regimes, 29 INT'L ORG. 827 (1975); Haas, Why
Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes, 32 WORLD POL. 357 (1980); Haas,
Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 207 (1982).
20. Krasner's definition, for example, envisions a relatively complex arrangement. It
would probably not include a particular rule of customary law or many specific international
agreements. Keohane, in fact, sharply distinguishes regimes from agreements, arguing that a
major function of regimes is to facilitate the conclusion of agreements. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 332-33.
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readily be applied to a variety of legal norms and institutions.21 With the
development of this theory, IL and IR have much to contribute to each
other. For its part, IL can offer modern IR scholars an immense reser-
voir of information about legal rules and institutions, the raw material
for the growth and application of the theory. Modem IR theory, on the
other hand, offers IL scholars an escape from the narrow positivism ex-
coriated by Boyle. In seeking to explain the underlying bases of conflict
and cooperation in international politics, the theory has begun to ask
fundamental analytical questions like those noted above, setting out an
ambitious research agenda. It brings to bear a powerful analytic ap-
proach, viewing international norms as products of sophisticated self-in-
terest, the rational choices of states in a decentralized world. In this
respect it forms part of a larger interdisciplinary "rationality project."
'22
The theory utilizes the rigorous modes of analysis characteristic of ra-
tional choice theory, notably economics and simple game theory. In
short, modern IR theory incorporates just those modes of inquiry and
analysis in which IL scholarship has been weakest.
An example might serve to illustrate the kinds of inquiry that modern
IR theory makes possible. Consider the Limited Test Ban Treaty
(LTBT)23 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),24 related
sets of norms designed to restrict the development and spread of nuclear
weapons. 25 The traditional IL approach would focus on the lawfulness
of state conduct under these conventional norms or under customary
norms arguably derived from them.26 Modern IR theory would supple-
21. See E. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 12-13 (1977) (analyzing
"norms").
22. This project motivates scholarship in political science, law, public administration and
many other fields. For a critical account, see D. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL
REASON 4-7 (1988).
23. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Limited
Test Ban Treaty].
24. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 811 (1968).
25. A case study of the development of these norms is used in M. McDOUGAL & W. M.
REISMAN, supra note 5, to illustrate that "[tihe traditional conception of international law as
'rules' quite obviously offers but the faintest glimpse of the structures, procedures and types of
decision that take place in the contemporary world community." Id. at 5; see id. at 8.46 (case
study of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons). A similar case study is used in Reisman,
International Law-making: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101,
114-19 (1981) [hereinafter Reisman, International Law-making] to illustrate the New Haven
School's approach to law-making. For useful discussions of the background of the LTBT and
NPT, see INTERNATIONAL ARMS AGREEMENTS: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 126-34 (LTBT),
148-59 (NPT) (C. Blacker & G. Duffy eds. 2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ARMS
AGREEMENTS].
26. Even McDougal's seminal article on nuclear testing takes this approach, albeit in a
non-traditional way. McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
340
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ment that approach with a broader scholarly perspective based on a ra-
tional choice model of state interaction.
First, an analyst using modem IR theory might inquire into the incen-
tives that lead rational states to cooperate in the formation of regimes
like the LTBT and NPT: what do states gain from such regimes that
makes them willing to restrain the development of important weapons
and the export of valuable technology? One might begin by examining
the structure of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union, the prime movers behind both conventions; game models would
be well suited to this task. In analyzing the widespread adoption of the
LTBT and NPT, economic models might be more useful: both conven-
tions can be interpreted as institutional arrangements designed to im-
prove the outcome of unregulated market-like interactions.
Second, one might extend this functional analysis to more detailed
characteristics of the two regimes. One of the salient institutional fea-
tures of the NPT, for example, is its reliance on the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA"), particularly for the application of "safe-
guards" to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Exactly what functions does
the IAEA perform, and what arrangements, if any, take its place in the
LTBT?
Third, one might inquire into the conditions that favored U.S.-Soviet
agreement and widespread participation in conventions governing these
two issue areas, when other bilateral and multilateral security regimes
have been difficult to form. One might also pursue the negative of this
inquiry: why have important near-nuclear states refused to ratify the
NPT? Can any lessons be learned that would assist in designing regimes
to restrict biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, or battle-
field nuclear weapons? Could conditions in those areas be modified by
joint or unilateral action to make cooperation easier?
Fourth, one might ask related questions about compliance, for both
the Soviet Union and the United States have seemingly modified their
conduct to conform with LTBT and NPT norms. What factors in these
areas encourage compliance with international rules in the face of obvi-
ous short-run incentives to cheat? How do the LTBT and NPT regimes
themselves encourage compliance?
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955). A recent, innovative IL casebook adopts the
same approach to the NPT and the LTBT in the setting of an hypothetical case. B. WESTON,
A. D'AMATO & R. FALK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORI-
ENTED COURSEBOOK 410-15, 426-40 (1980). I hasten to add that the article by Professor
Reisman, see supra note 25, and the McDougal & Reisman casebook, see supra note 5, go well
beyond the question of lawfulness to explore the process by which international norms are
established.
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While all these questions cannot be answered here, this article is
designed to make it possible for IL scholars, teachers and practitioners
to pursue similar inquiries across a wide range of issues. The article in-
troduces the major elements of modern IR theory and the work of its
leading contributors, and suggests their relevance to the study of interna-
tional law. The article is thus appropriately titled a "prospectus": it is a
detailed description of an enterprise designed to inform (and entice) po-
tential participants. The plan of the article is as follows. Section II in-
troduces the basic concepts of modern IR theory. Sections III through V
then explore its application in greater detail. Section III introduces ele-
mentary game theory and explores several basic game models that epito-
mize common forms of state interaction. Section IV analogizes
international politics to the operation of a market, and examines two
common forms of "political market failure." Section V, drawing on the
insights of Ronald Coase, examines certain structural deficiencies of in-
ternational politics in the light of market theory.
The structure of sections III through V emphasizes what Robert Keo-
hane has dubbed the "demand side" of modern IR theory27-why states
rationally demand international regimes-because this aspect can pro-
vide immediate insight into the functions of familiar norms and institu-
tions. Elements of the "supply side"-how international cooperation is
achieved-are also discussed. All three sections offer numerous specific
examples, suggesting many possibilities for further research. The final
section is a brief summary and conclusion, which returns to the example
of the LTBT and NPT regimes.
II. Fundamental Concepts
A. The Third Image
In 1959, the Realist scholar Kenneth Waltz examined the answers
given by political philosophers to the question "where are the major
causes of war [and, by implication, other events in world politics] to be
found?" The answers could be grouped under three headings: "within
man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system."
Waltz labeled these perspectives the first, second and third "images" of
international relations.28
27. See Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982) (in-
troducing supply and demand approach to international regimes) [hereinafter Keohane, De-
mand]. Supply and demand should not be too sharply distinguished, however, since the same
actors and many of the same influences are responsible for each. Id. at 326-27.




Hans Morgenthau's first image theory of international conflict, for ex-
ample, stemmed from beliefs about human nature. 29 Important second
image theories stress the internal political processes of states. Graham
Allison, for example, suggested that the actions of states in the Cuban
missile crisis could be interpreted as the output of large organizations or
as the result of bargaining among bureaucracies. 30 Other theorists inter-
pret foreign economic policy in terms of the efforts of politicians to be
reelected.31 All of these approaches are valuable and should be pursued,
singly and in combination.
32
Waltz, however, argued for the use of third image or systemic theory,
at least as the starting point of analysis, for two principal reasons. First,
the structure of the international system-the relation of its principal
units in terms of important variables33-creates the context within which
lower level causal factors operate. 34 As Waltz explained, "the situation
in which [states] act and interact constrains them from some actions,
disposes them toward others, and affects the outcomes of their interac-
tions.' ' 35 The constraints and incentives inherent in a situation must
therefore be considered at least simultaneously with lower-level variables,
and may themselves provide satisfactory explanations of outcomes.
36
Second, third image theory is more parsimonious than lower level theo-
ries. Because it deemphasizes the myriad causal variables at the level of
the state and the individual, it can suggest explanations based upon rela-
tively little information.
37
Waltz himself created third image theory on a grand scale. He argued
that the international political system is anarchic, that states are primar-
29. See id. at 21-24.
30. See G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 6
(1971).
31. For a review of such theories, see Baldwin, The Political Economy of Protectionism, in
IMPORT COMPETITION AND RESPONSE 263, 269-70 (3. Bhagwati ed. 1982).
32. For an argument in favor of a "multi-dimensional approach" drawing on all three
images, see Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 527-32. For a discussion of international trade
law that emphasizes both structural influences and domestic interest group politics, see Ab-
bott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985) [hereinafter Abbott, Trading Nation's Dilemma].
33. See K. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79 (1979) [hereinafter K.
WALTZ, THEORY].
34. See Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 528-29; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 25-26.
35. K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 65.
36. See id. at 39; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 25-26.
37. See K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 65; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 25; Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 525, 529. Parsimony is generally
considered a desirable attribute of any scientific theory. See Friedman, The Methodology of
Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 10 (1953) (referring to "simplic-
ity"). But see M. BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 24-25 (1980).
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ily concerned with power, and that differences in power are the principal
distinctions among states. The distribution of power, especially among
the "great powers," therefore, determines the structure of the interna-
tional system at any given time. Waltz's work analyzed the effects of
various power distributions on state interactions, particularly balance of
power politics.
38
Impressive as it is, Waltz's theory is of limited relevance to IL schol-
ars. Like traditional Realism, it implicitly denies the value of interna-
tional law as a discipline. Modern theorists like Robert Keohane,
39
Robert Axelrod, 4° Duncan Snidal,41 Arthur Stein, 42 Robert Jervis, 43 and
Kenneth Oye, 44 however, have built on Waltz's structural approach and
created a third image theory expressly concerned with the role of interna-
tional rules, regimes and institutions. Many of the systemic factors em-
phasized by Waltz remain important in modern IR theory. Anarchy, for
example, remains a fundamental assumption.45 The distribution of
power can also be important.46 Yet despite these common elements,
modern structural theory differs from Waltz's analysis in major ways.
The most basic difference is that factors in addition to the distribution
of power are seen as determining the structure of state interactions. As
discussed more fully below, modern theorists observe that states pursue
many goals other than power, and that relative power does not dominate
38. See K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra
note 16, at 62, 206.
39. See, e.g., R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16; Keohane, Theory, supra
note 12; Keohane, Demand, supra note 27.
40. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Axelrod & Keohane,
Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226 (1985).
41. See Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985)
[hereinafter Snidal, Game Theory]; Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L
ORG. 579 (1985) [hereinafter Snidal, HS Theory]; Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Di-
lemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 923
(1985) [hereinafter Snidal, Coordination].
42. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19; Stein, The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain,
the United States, and the International Economic Order, 38 INT'L ORG. 355 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Stein, Hegemon's Dilemma].
43. See Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167 (1978)
[hereinafter Jervis, Security Dilemma]; Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982)
[hereinafter Jervis, Security Regimes].
44. See Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38
WORLD POL. 1 (1985).
45. See id. at 1; infra text accompanying notes 59-70.
46. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 63 (modern regime theory
can take account of Realist insights about power); id. at 70-73 (relations of power help deter-
mine character of regimes); Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 930, 935 (more powerful
states disproportionately influence content of international regimes); Young, Regime Dynam-
ics, supra note 19, at 284-85 (powerful states may impose regimes). Power in the relevant issue
area may be as important as power on a world scale, however. See, e.g., R. KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 197 (applying hegemonic stability theorem on issue area basis).
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every interaction.47 The structure of many interactions, then, largely de-
pends upon the specific characteristics of the issue area: the courses of
action among which states must choose and the outcomes expected to
result from different combinations of choices. This notion of structure is
strategic, emphasizing how each state's actions advance its own goals and
affect the situations of others. The analysis of strategic structure charac-
terizes rational choice theory,48 from which modern IR theory draws
heavily.
Other differences follow from this more complex view of structure.
Modern IR theorists tend to shift their focus from the international sys-
tem as a whole to the interactions in particular issue areas.49 This nar-
rower focus is appropriate, indeed necessary, because different issue areas
exhibit strikingly different structures. For example, a concern for rela-
tive power may dominate interactions between military rivals on matters
of security, making cooperation difficult, but interactions among friendly
states on economic or environmental issues may be more conducive to
cooperation.
Modern IR theorists also consider some structural attributes that do
not figure in Waltz's work, such as the adequacy of the information avail-
able to states and the transaction costs of state interaction. Factors like
these help determine the extent to which states can act effectively to im-
prove their welfare within particular strategic structures.
Finally, modern IR theory is distinguished by its emphasis on interna-
tional rules, regimes and institutions, ranging from broad general norms,
like those recognizing the authority of states and restraining the use of
force, to specific regimes for particular issue areas, such as the rules em-
bodied in arms limitation accords. Norms and institutions figure in the
theory in two complementary ways. First, they are often the focus of
analysis, interpreted functionally as responses to a situation in which col-
lective action promises superior results. In addition, established norms
and institutions become part of the framework of state interaction, and
must be included among the "givens" in a structural analysis.50 Like law
47. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
48. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 65-70; Snidal, Coordination,
supra note 41, at 924-25.
49. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 25, 45. An issue area is a subjectively
defined set of problems dealt with by states and other actors as a substantive unit. See R.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 61.
50. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 26, 57-58; Snidal, Game The-
ory, supra note 41, at 45. For a discussion of the pitfalls in attempting to reason from func-
tions (effects) back to causes, see R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 80-82.
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in modern republican political theory, 51 international norms can even
change the underlying situation. By making the political environment
more benign, for example, international norms may allow states to
devote more attention to goals requiring cooperation.
B. "The Anarchical Society"
52
Like most successful theories, modern IR theory begins with a model:
a simplified, abstract description of the relevant entities and relation-
ships.5 3 In fact, the theory utilizes many models to represent the diverse
structures of particular issue areas. All, however, incorporate certain
common assumptions designed to isolate the essential structural
features.
54
Two major assumptions characterize the international political system
as a whole.
(1) The international system is a system of states. Modern IR theorists
recognize that non-state actors-such as multinational enterprises, non-
governmental organizations and international institutions-can play sig-
nificant roles in international politics.5 5 Yet they still treat states as the
primary actors in the system, much as Realist theorists do.56 This em-
phasis is at least in part a product of the theory's concern with rules,
regimes and institutions: states are treated as the primary actors because
they are observed to be the principal creators and objects of international
normative orders.5 7 Non-state actors can be incorporated into specific
models when their influence warrants it.58
51. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1986).
52. See H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS
(1977).
53. For discussions of the use of models, see, e.g., A. ISAAK, SCOPE AND METHODS OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 135-49 (1975); K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 7-13; Snidal, Game
Theory, supra note 41, at 32-36; R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, MODERN POLITICAL ECON-
OMY 9 (1978). See also W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE
POLITICAL THEORY xi (1973).
54. For useful discussions of the kinds of assumptions referred to here, see T. MOE, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 13-19 (1980); W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at
8-37.
55. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 26. For a discussion of the
roles played by private actors, individual public officials, and international institutions, see R.
KEOHANE & J. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 33-
36 (1977).
56. See K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 93-97; Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at
508, 529; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 25.
57. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 25, 61-62 (states typically
create regimes; regimes typically affect national controls and interstate agreements, not private
activity).
58. See, e.g., R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 150-77 (analysis of post-




(2) The system of states is anarchic. Even Realists recognize that the
international system is "flecked with particles of government and alloyed
with elements of community"; 59 modern IR theorists stress the role of
international norms and institutions. 60 Still, both groups take anarchy
as the basic ordering principle of the system.61 In this context, anarchy is
not synonymous with chaos or disorder. It means instead that power
and authority are decentralized, held only by the constituent units, the
states. No central institutions are empowered to decide for all. Simi-
larly, authority is not hierarchical: no institution, and no state, can legit-
imately control the actions of other states by virtue of its position. More
powerful states can influence weaker ones, but all are formally equal, a
condition reinforced by the "constitutional" rules of classical interna-
tional law.
62
Consistent with the assumption of anarchy, modern IR theorists do
not cdnceptualize international rules and regimes as parts of a naturally
emerging supranational order; such a viewpoint would be easy to criti-
cize as Utopian. Rather, they interpret them as intentional artifacts of
state interaction.63 This contractarian approach64 leads naturally to con-
sideration of the functions that rules and regimes perform for states and
59. K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 114.
60. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 226; Donnelly, supra note 10, at 601.
61. See, e.g., R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 62-63; Snidal, Game
Theory, supra note 41, at 36 (game theory "illuminates the fundamental issues of international
anarchy"); Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 300; Oye, supra note 44, at 1; K. WALTZ,
THEORY, supra note 33, at 114-15; Young, Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the Inter-
national Polity, 30 WORLD POL. 241, 242 (1978) [hereinafter Young, Anarchy and Social
Choice]. In contrast to Realist theory and modem IR theory, other schools see social institu-
tions as pervasive in international society. See Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 14, at
192-94 (discussing theorists in "Grotian tradition").
62. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 6, at 17-18; see also Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (elaborating on many such classical
principles).
63. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 63.
64. Because it interprets regimes as products of conscious choice by rational states, mod-
em IR theory will contribute to the debate over those aspects of international law theory in
which the contractarian element is controversial: (1) the role of state consent in the creation of
customary law, see Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World,
in STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 513; Charney, The
Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 1985 BR. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 1-2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) com-
ment b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; (2) the "persistent objector" principle,
see Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 433-34;
Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in Inter-
national Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985); Charney, supra, at 2-5; and (3) the emergence
of general customary law from treaties, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, § 102(3).
Yale Journal of International Law
the conditions that encourage or inhibit their creation, i.e., the demand
and supply inquiries emphasized in this article.
Because anarchy implies a lack of central direction, the assumption of
anarchy also leads to consideration of the ways in which states select
norms, that is, the methods of international social choice.65 In a decen-
tralized political environment, these methods must rely on more or less
direct accommodation of differences in preferences, although voting and
other hierarchical procedures are used in some international organiza-
tions. 66 IR theorists have identified force and coercion,67 bargaining, 68
and tacit adaptation through conventions69 as the principal methods of
international social choice. Although this article does not undertake the
project, analysis of the sources of international law and other important
legal principles in the light of social choice theory could prove highly
fruitful. 70
C. The State as Rational Egoist
Modem IR theory seeks to abstract from the attributes of particular
states, their internal political processes, leaders and people. The theory
therefore attributes to states, by assumption, certain common, idealized
65. Social choice methods are the procedures used by political systems to choose among or
aggregate individual preferences. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1-2 (1979); W. RIKER &
P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 2 (politics is process of social choice among individual pref-
erences). The possible methods range from violence to parliamentary democracy. See Young,
Anarchy and Social Choice, supra note 61, at 242, 245-48.
66. See K. WALTz, THEORY, supra note 33, at 113; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 18; Young, Anarchy and Social Choice, supra note 61, at 248. For a survey of
the leading organizations, see L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 1387-412
(organizations for technical, social and cultural cooperation), 1413-69 (European
Communities).
67. See Young, Anarchy and Social Choice, supra note 61, at 250-56; see also R. KEO-
HANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 51-53, 76.
68. See, e.g., Young, Anarchy and Social Choice, supra note 61, at 250. For discussion of
formal theories of bargaining, see, e.g., 0. YOUNG, BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NE-
GOTIATION (1975); G. SNYDER & P. DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: BARGAINING,
DECISION-MAKING, AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES 22-27, 33-339
(1977).
69. See, e.g., R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 52. Coordination
problems are often resolved through the emergence of conventions, even in the absence of
communication. See infra text accompanying notes 189-90.
70. Conceiving of force as a method of social choice, for example, helps explain why the
absence of other workable methods, such as a powerful Security Council, places such a strain
on Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and other legal restraints on the use of force. See Franck,
Who Killed Article 2(4)? or, Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 809 (1970); Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4), 78




characteristics, and it treats these as constants, not as variables. 71 Most
important are the following:
(1) States are unitary actors. In fact, as already suggested, interest
group pressures, bureaucratic or electoral politics, and other internal
conflicts affect foreign policy decisions in every state. Structural theory,
however, would be virtually impossible without the assumption of unity;
analysis of structural incentives would otherwise bog down in attempting
to accommodate the variegated internal decision processes of states.
72
(2) States are egoists. Their preferences are based on assessments of
their own w'ell-being. 73 The Realist assumption of egoism is useful in a
theory that analyzes the responses of states to external, structural incen-
tives, but it is also retained, at least in part, as an intellectual tactic.
Those who assert the relevance of international law and institutions are
often criticized as Utopian, forced to invoke fictions like a "world-wide
'community of nations' dedicated to the preservation of peace." 74 With
the assumption of egoism, however, modern IR theory can account for
international norms and institutions on hard-headed Realist premises,
without the need to "smuggle in" assumptions of altruism or
cosmopolitanism.
75
Modem IR theorists diverge sharply from traditional Realists, how-
ever, in their understanding of the interests that egoistic states pursue.
Realists like Waltz assume that states are primarily concerned with
power.76 Since power is inherently relative-whatever strengthens one
rival necessarily disadvantages the other77-virtually all state interac-
71. See Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 508-09; R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 25. The theory does not, of course, treat all states as identical, giving great
weight to varying state interests and preferences, see supra notes 47-48, and accompanying
text; Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 529, and to differences in power and other capabili-
ties, see supra note 46, and accompanying text.
72. See R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 27, 29; Nye, Nuclear Learn-
ing and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 371, 398-99 (1987) [hereinafter Nye,
Nuclear Learning]. Internal state political processes may, however, figure in the specificationi
of state preferences. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 40-42.
73. See R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 27, 66; cf Krasner, Struc-
tural Causes, supra note 14, at 195; 0. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY 17
(1979) ("[ljndividual subjects will act to maximize their own welfare.") [hereinafter 0.
YOUNG, COMPLIANCE]; Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 593.
74. Kristol, International Law and International Lies, Wall St. J., June 21, 1985, at 26, col.
4.
75. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 66-67.
76. According to Waltz, states "are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own
preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination." K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra
note 33, at 118.
77. See Jervis, Security Regimes, supra note 43, at 359 (speaking about military power);
Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, 36 INT'L
ORG. 497, 498 (1982) [hereinafter Krasner, Regimes and Realism].
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tions are zero-sum, and cooperation is meaningless. 78 Modern IR theo-
rists, however, begin with a broader understanding: "[T]he implication
that the search for power constitutes an overriding interest in all cases
... [is] rejected. Under different systemic conditions states will define
their self-interests differently." '79
As arms control agreements attest, even military rivals may find it in
their interest to control their competition for power. In settings like
Western Europe and North America, moreover, what Keohane and Nye
called "complex interdependence"-high levels of interaction on many
issues, via multiple channels, public and private, formal and informal-
can make the use of military force practically irrelevant. 80 States in com-
plex interdependence, and all states to some degree, can turn their atten-
tion to the pursuit of wealth and such "quality of life" goals as a cleaner
environment."' Goals like these are positive-sum: they can only be
achieved, or can be more fully achieved, with international coopera-
tion.8 2 Even egoistic states, then, will have incentives to cooperate in the
creation of regimes that promise superior outcomes.
(3) States are rational. They have consistently ordered preferences
and choose among alternative courses of action so as to further those
preferences.83 The rationality assumption is essential to structural the-
ory. It allows the analyst to interpret the actions of states as meaningful,
78. See Krasner, Regimes and Realism, supra note 77, at 498; Snidal, Game Theory, supra
note 41, at 39; Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Internationalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988).
79. Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 529; see also Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at
593-94.
80. Even in such relationships, military power may have important political consequences,
and force may be a more realistic option in relations with other states. But the easy resort to
force seen as characteristic by Realists does not reflect the practice of states in "complex inter-
dependence." See R. KEOHANE & J. NYE, supra note 55, at 24-29. Complex interdependence
was designed as an ideal type, to be contrasted with the ideal of Realism. See id. at 23-24.
81. See id. at 23-29 (in complex interdependence, security issues do not always dominate
interstate relations); R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 18-22; Keohane,
Theory, supra note 12, at 508, 529.
82. See Krasner, Regimes and Realism, supra note 77, at 498-99; Snidal, Game Theory,
supra note 41, at 39; Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 311; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HE-
GEMONY, supra note 16, at 51-54. These interactions are best described, in Schelling's phrase,
as "mixed-motive games." Id. at 67.
83. Rationality, one should note, is not taken to encompass perfect information; indeed,
the functions of regimes in providing information are important subjects of analysis. See infra
text accompanying notes 344-63. Keohane has also made use of the theory of bounded ration-
ality originated by Herbert Simon, which recognizes the cognitive limits of the human mind.
See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 111-16. For a brief discussion of
Simon's theory, see E. MACKAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 135-43 (1980).
Although corporate entities like states may be able to devote far more resources to decision-
making than individuals, bounded rationality still implies that states simply never consider
some opportunities for beneficial cooperation. Keohane suggests, however, that the fact that
independent action is likely to be less than optimal reduces the opportunity cost of joining a
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purposive conduct, and-together with the assumption of unity-to rea-
son directly from structural incentives to state responses without consid-
ering internal decision-making processes. 84 For precisely these reasons,
the assumption of state rationality has also been a "cornerstone of
Realism." 85
Modem theorists, though, hold a broad view of state rationality akin
to their view of state interests. In this view, rationality goes beyond the
"simple pursuit of immediate self-interest. ' 86 Rational states can calcu-
late the future benefits and costs of their actions, and they may forego
short-run advantages for greater long-run benefits. They can also choose
their actions with reference to the potential responses of other states.
What Snidal calls "strategic rationality" makes it possible for states to
operate effectively in an interdependent, positive-sum world.87
D. The Rational Actor Approach
1. Simplifying Assumptions
The explicit use of idealized assumptions is unfamiliar to most IL
scholars and may lead some to question the value of modem IR theory.
A few additional comments on this methodology therefore seem
appropriate.
All analysts recognize that assumptions like unity and rationality omit
important real-world variables. Without the simplification such assump-
tions provide, however, a theory could do little more than describe; it
would noi be a workable, let alone a parsimonious, tool for explanation
and prediction.8 8 In addition, the assumptions of a particular theory
serve to highlight the elements that figure in its explanatory logic. 89 The
assumptions of unity and rationality, for example, direct attention to the
regime, thereby making international regimes more attractive. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HE-
GEMONY, supra note 16, at 114-15.
84. See R. KEOHANE, AFER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 27, 66; Keohane, Theory,
supra note 12, at 508, 529; Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 35, 38-39; 0. YOUNG,
COMPLIANCE, supra note 73, at 15-17; R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, supra note 53, at 16-18,
27.
85. Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 38.
86. Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 594.
87. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 38-40.
88. R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, supra note 53, at 9-10; Friedman, supra note 37, at 30;
Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 35, 38-40; K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 6-7.
Producing explanations and predictions is the aim of the scientific method generally. It is
often said that explanation and prediction are logically identical, differing only in whether
theory is applied to a past event or to a future one. See A. ISAAK, supra note 53, at 105-06,
113-15; M. BLAUG, supra note 37, at 3-4. In fact, however, some scientific theories predict
without explaining (Newton's theory of gravitation) and others explain without predicting
(Darwin's theory of evolution). See id. at 4-9.
89. See, e.g., Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 28, 32-34.
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influence of external incentives on the actions of states; they indicate that
internal decision processes do not figure in a structural theory. 90 Essen-
tially the same assumptions highlight external incentives in
microeconomic theory. 91 The third image perspective, however, makes it
difficult to explain in detail the behavior of individual states. The the-
ory's strength is in explaining general tendencies and patterns of re-
sponse; it will be more or less powerful as states follow or diverge from
those patterns.
92
Rational actor assumptions do not constrain modem IR theory as
much as may appear. Egoism, in particular, is only given content by the
specification of state preferences, and these can vary widely. Keohane,
for example, discusses the possibility of altruistic preferences, while rec-
ognizing that these may be difficult to distinguish from the pursuit of
long-run self-interest. 93 In analyzing measures like foreign assistance or
the Generalized System of Preferences, consideration of the interplay be-
tween egoism and altruism can greatly enrich analysis. Assumptions like
anarchy and state primacy can also be modified to reflect international
rules and institutions, hierarchical arrangements like the European Com-
munities, or important sub-state actors. 9
4
90. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 27, 29, 66, 70.
91. In standard economic analysis, firms are typically identified as unitary actors making
rational decisions aimed at maximizing profits. See R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D. PURVIS,
ECONOMICS 48-49 (7th ed..1984). Just as in modem IR theory, these assumptions allow econ-
omists parsimoniously to explain, at least generally, how firms and householdg respond to
different market structures. See K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 71-72; R. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 27. For more detailed analysis, economists have begun
to develop theories of the firm. The classic work is Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); for a more recent analysis, see Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Infor-
mation Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EON. REV. 777 (1972).
92. See, e.g., K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 118, 121-22 (expecting specific predic-
tions is like expecting theory of gravitation to predict exactly path of falling leaf). Economics,
similarly, can more easily predict individual behavior under perfect competition or monopoly
than under oligopoly, where there is no clearly best course of action for the firm. See W.
BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 524-25 (3d ed. 1985); R.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 27-28. Many situations in international
politics resemble the conditions of oligopoly. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 25,
31-32; ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 131-37 (B. Russett ed. 1968); R.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 28-29; K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33,
at 116-28.
93. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 120-31; see also Kin-
dleberger, Systems of International Economic Organization, in MONEY AND THE COMING
WORLD ORDER 15, 18-19 (D. Calleo ed. 1976) [hereinafter Kindleberger, Systems]. In most
cases, the distinction can be maintained, for states infrequently act in ways that even appear
altruistic.
94. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 35 (discussing diversity of models possible
under game theory). Sub-state actors are not yet well integrated into the theory. See Snidal,
Coordination, supra note 41, at 926; Frank, The First Oil Regime, 37 WORLD POL. 586 (1985)
(regime analysis does not capture interdependence of states and non-state actors).
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Snidal argues that modem IR theory can only purport to explain state
behavior if its assumptions, however simplified, accord with reality. If its
adherents aspire to become scientific, he asserts, they must test and refine
their assumptions. 95 This program is to be applauded. Yet rational actor
assumptions have already proven their worth in many fields of inquiry.
If used flexibly, with caution, and in their proper domain, they can lead
to compelling explanations.
2. "Scientific" Theory
As the preceding discussion indicates, many IR scholars have been
greatly concerned with scientific rigor. Both supporters and critics of
modem IR theory have attempted to follow the positivistic precepts of
the natural sciences-e.g., specifying simplifying assumptions, isolating
causal variables, and generating deductive explanations and predic-
tions96 -in spite of obstacles such as the difficulty of empirical testing.
97
Most international lawyers will not wish to follow such an austere and
treacherous path. Fortunately, even a more relaxed approach can yield
valuable dividends. Keohane points out that "[m]uch of what students
of world politics do ... is to make the actions of states understandable
. . . that is, in [anthropologist Clifford] Geertz's words, to provide 'a
context within which they can be intelligibly described.' -98 Modem IR
theory can help IL scholars to "illuminate... [the] social phenomena" of
international rules, regimes and institutions by describing and interpret-
95. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 584; Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at
27, 33-36, 38 n.17; see also R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 69-75 (dis-
cussing limitations of rational-choice models).
Waltz, in contrast, professes the pure instrumentalist position associated with Milton Fried-
man: the realism of a theory's assumptions is unimportant; the only test is whether the theory
is useful in prediction. See K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 116-19; Friedman, supra
note 37, at 14-15. The essay in which Friedman puts forth this position is the "centerpiece of
postwar economic methodology ... [Unfortunately], so subtle is Friedman's argument that
even now it is difficult to find two economists who will agree on precisely what it was that
Friedman said." M. BLAUG, supra note 37, at 103. For an extensive discussion and critique of
this extreme position, sed id. at 103-20.
96. See, e.g., Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41. See also B. RUssETr & H. STARR,
WORLD POLITICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE 25-30 (2d ed. 1985); Keohane, Theory, supra note
12, at 505 (considering applicability of philosophy of science criteria of Imre Lakatos); K.
WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 1-17. For a general discussion of the application of the
scientific method to political science, see A. ISAAK, supra note 53, at 47-61.
97. See Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 506. For a thorough debunking of the "mod-
ernist" method in economics, the social and even the physical sciences, see McCloskey, The
Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON. LIT. 481 (1983). For a somewhat cynical account of why
social science has become so rigorously scientific, see Rogowski, Rationalist Theories of Poli-
tics: A Midterm Report, 30 WORLD POL. 296 (1978).
98. See Keohane, Theory, supra note 12, at 505-06, citing C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF CULTURES (1973).
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ing them more richly; even if the theory's potential deductive power is
not fully tapped.99
E. Summary
Modern IR theory differs from structural Realist theories of interna-
tional politics in its emphasis on the role of international rules, regimes
and institutions. The theory looks for causal factors in the structure of
state interactions, but views that structure primarily in terms of the inter-
play of diverse state goals and strategies in particular issue areas, not
simply in terms of the distribution of power. Because of this broader
strategic view, characteristics like information and transactions costs be-
come'relevant; rules, regimes and institutions are also seen as significant
structural characteristics.
To make structural analysis possible, states are treated as the primary
actors in a decentralized political environment and are assumed to be-
have as rational egoists: each state's preferences are based on assess-
ments of its own well-being, and courses of action are chosen so as to
further those preferences. The creation of international rules, regimes
and institutions is seen as a purposeful activity designed to improve un-
satisfactory situations. Because of its structural basis, the strength of
modern IR theory lies in explaining general tendencies and patterns of
state behavior.
III. Game Theory and Problems of Collective Action
A. Introduction
Game theory is an especially concrete and graphic form of rational
actor theory. A "game" in game theory is a model of a situation in
which two or more rational actors must choose among alternate courses
of action. 1°° Game models are natural adjuncts to third image theory,
because they show the results of different combinations of actions in
terms of the actors' own preferences. Games reveal how the conduct of
99. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 26, 28-32.
100. For relatively accessible introductions to game theory, see H. HAMBURGER, GAMES
AS MODELS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA (1979); F. ZAGARE, GAME THEORY: CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS (1984); G. SNYDER & P. DIESING, supra note 68, at 37-66; R. LUCE & H.
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957); T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF' CONFLICT (2d
ed. 198.0) [hereinafter T. SCHELLING, STRATEGY]. See also M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS (1983).
Game theory can become highly mathematical, beyond the ability of most international
lawyers, certainly the present author. See, e.g., R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra. Nonetheless,
even sophisticated analysts find valuable insights in elementary game analysis. See, e.g.,
Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41; Oye, supra note 44, at 2 n.2.
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each player in a situation of interdependence affects itself and others, and
expose "the pattern of structural constraints on players' choices."
o10'
They have become a valuable tool for modern IR scholars.
Four elements are necessary to define a game: the players, their op-
tions, the objective outcomes resulting from different combinations of
player choices, and the values the players place on those outcomes, called
"payoffs." In modern IR theory, the players are usually states, but they
can also be private actors, as in Charles Lipson's work on international
banks.102 The players' options must be specified for each issue area.103
For simplicity, however, theorists often specify two general choices, rep-
resenting the "basic modalities" of cooperation and non-cooperation,
often called "defection."'04
The "2x2" game, depicted as a matrix in which two actors each face
two choices, is the simplest and most common format. 10 5 Both dimen-
sions must sometimes be expanded, making the analysis more complex
and more difficult to depict graphically. When there are more than two
actors, for example, the increased difficulty of bargaining may hamper
cooperation. Larger numbers, on the other hand, may make possible
some forms of cooperation-Snidal gives the example of the European
Airbus--out of reach for smaller groups.
10 6
A game known as "Harmony" is shown in figure 1 to illustrate the 2x2
format. In this matrix, State I must choose between the top and bottom
rows, representing cooperation and defection. State II must choose be-
tween the left and right columns, representing the same options. The
four cells of the matrix represent the four possible factual outcomes.
These must be specified for particular interactions: in analyzing an inter-
national trade issue, cell 1 (CC, indicating mutual cooperation) might
101. Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs, 37 WORLD POL.
I 1 [hereinafter Lipson, Cooperation]; see Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 925; Snidal,
Game Theory, supra note 41, at 26-28.
102. Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts, 38
WORLD POL. 200 (1985).
103. In some situations, weaker states may in fact have little or no choice. Although game
models can depict this situation, some scholars argue that games may be more useful in analyz-
ing West-West or East-West relations than North-South relations. See Snidal, Game Theory,
supra note 41, at 40; Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 926; R. KEOHANE, AFrER HE-
GEMONY, supra note 16, at 70-73.
104. See G. SNYDER & P. DIESING, supra note 68, at 83; Snidal, Game Theory, supra note
41, at, 37.
105. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 925. Other formats include the "extensive
form," a decision tree that depicts a sequence of plays, see Wagner, The Theory of Games and
the Problem of International Cooperation, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 330, 333 (1983), and a non-
graphical statement of the players' preference orderings, see Oye, supra note 44, at 7-8.
106. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 927-30; Snidal, Game Theory, supra note
41, at 52-55; Oye, supra note 44, at 19-20; Wagner, supra note 105, at 344.








represent mutual free trade, cell 4 (DD, designating mutual defection) a
trade war; in a security setting, cell 1 might represent arms control or
mutual disarmament, cell 4 an arms race, cell 2 (DC) or 3 (CD) unilat-
eral disarmament. The pairs of numbers in the cells represent the payoffs
associated with these outcomes; the payoff to State I is given first, These
payoffs are ordinal, with 4 the highest.107
Assigning payoffs is both the most important and the most problemati-
cal aspect of defining a game. Payoffs are intended to represent subjec-
tive preferences, but true subjective preferences are necessarily fictional
in the case of a collective, inanimate entity like a state. The greatest
temptation is to reason backward from outcomes to preferences, but that
would render analysis circular. Preferences of political leaders can be
researched in official documents, memoirs, and the like, but these sources
107. Payoffs designated by cardinal numbers are usually impossible to specify. When the
intensity of the players' preferences is important, one may need to specify interval level prefer-
ences, or at least make some estimate of relative intensity. Examples are situations in which a
state must compare payoffs between games in different issue areas or over time, and situations
in which an interaction is vital to one state but unimportant to the other. In the second case,
some comparison of intensity between players would also be required. See Snidal, Game The-
ory, supra note 41, at 46-47; Oye, supra note 44, at 8-9.
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may be incomplete and even intentionally misleading. Snidal argues that
specification of payoffs based on the analyst's theoretical understanding
of an issue area is at present the most satisfactory solution,10 8 and that is
the approach taken in this article. Ultimately, though, a more complete
understanding of state preferences-taking account of the external situa-
tion, domestic politics, and prevailing ideas and beliefs-must be inte-
grated into structural theory.
In the Harmony game, each player's first preference is for the jointly
cooperative outcome; indeed, each prefers unilateral cooperation to uni-
lateral noncooperation. In these circumstances, relations between the
players 9hould be naturally harmonious, with little need for rules or insti-
tutions. Although two states with the preferences of liberal economists
would find international trade a Harmony game, real-world examples are
hard to find.109 At the opposite extreme is Deadlock, shown in figure 2.
In this game, at least one player (here both) prefers mutual noncoopera-
tion to mutual cooperation, and conflict is inevitable. Examples of Dead-
lock are unfortunately easier to identify. Downs, Rocke and Siverson
suggest, for example, that Deadlock may characterize certain arms
races.110
In games between the extremes of Harmony and Deadlock, the condi-
tions of play are often crucial to the outcome. International rules and
regimes can substantially affect outcomes, payoffs, even the definition of
the players and their choices. 11 Characteristics such as the number of
times a game is expected to be played, the number of players, their ability
to communicate, the information available to them, and their ability to
change their moves can also affect outcomes. 112 Such characteristics are
particularly relevant in analyzing when cooperative solutions can be
reached.
Even if all these conditions are carefully specified, though, the use of
game models "necessarily entails setting aside some contextual and his-
108. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 40-44.
109. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 301-02; Oye, supra note 44, at 6-7; see also
R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 51-52.
110. An arms race would reflect Deadlock preferences where the weaker of two rival states
believes that equal military expenditures will increase its relative strength, while arms control
will freeze its inferior position. See Downs, Rocke & Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation,
38 WORLD POL. 118, 120-23 (1985). States may also have Deadlock preferences because of the
power of an internal pressure group, like the arms industry. Id.; see also Oye, supra note 44, at
6-7; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 229-3 1.
111. See Snidal, aame Theory, supra note 41, at 35, 45; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note
40, at 238.
112. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 35, 45, 48-52; Snidal, Coordination,
supra note 41, at 927; Oye, supra note 44; at 12-16; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra
note 16, at 75-76; Wagner, supra note 105, at 331-33.








torical richness." The simplicity of game models limits their ability to
describe real-world phenomena. Games compensate for these limita-
tions, however, "by clearing away the underbrush of detail to facilitate
clarity and rigor."
113
B. The Prisoners' Dilemma
1. Demand
To most IR scholars, the famous game known as the Prisoners' Di-
lemma (PD) best exemplifies the reasons why states seek collective action
and why cooperation is often difficult to achieve. 1 4 Although all collec-
tive action problems are not PDs, many are, and the game dramatically
113. Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 925; see also Snidal, Game Theory, supra note
41, at 26-28; Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 1, 10-11.
114. Discussion of the PD draws primarily upon the following sources: Snidal, Coordina-
tion, supra note 41, at 926-31; Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 2-12; Stein, Collabora-
tion, supra note 19, at 304-08; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 67-69;
Snyder, "Prisoners' Dilemma" and "Chicken"Models in International Politics, 15 INT'L STUD.
Q. 66 (1971) [hereinafter Snyder, "PD" and "Chicken" Models]; Conybeare, Public Goods,






illustrates the broader class of problems arising from the unrestrained
pursuit of short-term self-interest.115
The 2x2 PD matrix is shown in figure 3.116 The classic PD game is
played only once. Players are assumed to be unable to communicate or
to see each other's moves, but to be aware of all the information on the
matrix. Under these restrictive conditions-which can often be re-
laxed-the incentive structure of the PD can lead to a "tragic" outcome
at odds with the players' own interests.
First, in the symmetrical PD incentive structure, each player has an
"offensive" incentive to defect, i.e., an interest in maximizing its payoff.
State I, for example, can realize its highest possible payoff by defecting
while State II cooperates (cell 3: DC). Offensive defection is predatory:
compared to mutual cooperation (cell 1: CC), State I's payoff increases
to 4, while that of State II drops to 1, the "sucker's payoff."117 Each
player also has a "defensive" incentive to defect, i.e., an interest in avoid-
ing a very low payoff. Even if State II wished to cooperate, for example,
it can see that cooperation will likely lead to the sucker's payoff, while
defection will guarantee a payoff of at least 2 (cell 4: DD). In short,
defection is the "dominant strategy" for each player: each is better off
defecting whatever the other does. This feature of the PD explains much
international conflict.
If both players defect, however, each receives a lower payoff than it
could have received through mutual cooperation. By definition, the joint
payoff is less than the social optimum, the maximum amount jointly ob-
tainable by the players. To avoid joint defection and gain the higher
payoffs available from cooperation, rational states in a PD will tend to
seek international rules and institutions designed to restrain defection.
Because of the defensive incentives for defection, such restraints must
apply to all players: "states surrender some of their authority or auton-
[hereinafter Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners'Dilemmas]; Wagner, supra note 105, at 330-
36; see also Abbott, Trading Nation's Dilemma, supra note 32, at 504 n.17, 504-07.
115. See Gowa, Anarchy, Egoism and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and
International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 167, 171-75 (1986); Axelrod & Keohane, supra note
40, at 231.
116. The narrative form of the PD is the tale of two guilty prisoners suspected of a major
crime. The DA has only enough evidence to convict them of misdemeanors. Each prisoner
knows that, if neither confesses, both will receive only light sentences; if both confess, however,
both will be subject to more severe felony sentences. To elicit confessions, the DA meets with
each prisoner separately and offers the following deal: if either prisoner confesses while the
other does not, all charges against the confessor will be dropped, while the nonconfessor will
receive the maximum possible sentence. The typical outcome is confession by both prisoners,
resulting in prison sentences that they could have avoided by silence.
117. Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners'Dilemmas, supra note 114, at 8. The joint payoff
in cell 1 must be greater than the average of the joint payoffs in cells 2 and 3. Otherwise, in an
iterated game, the players could profit by alternating defections. See Axelrod & Keohane,
supra note 40, at 229 n.4.
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omy in return for other states doing the same."'"" For many social con-
tract theorists, similar incentives operating on individuals explain the
formation of the state itself as an institution restraining defection from
social norms. 119
2. PDs in International Politics
Situations characterized by PD incentives are common, if not perva-
sive, in international life. A particularly important PD analogue, empha-
sized by Realists, is the "security dilemma."'120 Every state will naturally
take measures to ensure its own security. Other states, however-uncer-
118. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 937; cf Stein, Collaboration, supra note
19, at 301, 304, 316.
119. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVI-
ATHAN 21-31 (1975); Bush, Individual Welfare in Anarchy, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE THE-
ORY OF ANARCHY 5 (G. Tullock ed. 1972); Gunning, Towards a Theory of the Evolution of
Government, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE THEORY OF ANARCHY, supra, at 19.
120. See Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 2 WORLD POL. 157
(1950); Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43; Snyder, "PD" and "Chicken" Models, supra
note 114, at 77-80; Jervis, Security Regimes, supra note 43, at 358-59. For a different interpre.
tation, see Wagner, supra note 105, at 337-40.
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tain of their neighbors' motives and observing that most weapons can be
used to attack as well as to defend-may perceive such actions as a
threat. These states in turn will take additional precautions, but these
measures will create greater insecurity in other states, and so on, in a
spiral of insecurity. The defensive side of the PD-magnified here by the
potentially devastating nature of the sucker's payoff-thus drives the se-
curity dilemma. Its predatory side, the desire to gain power relative to
one's rivals, also contributes. Hostile states and blocs like the United
States and the Soviet Union can become enmeshed in an ongoing security
dilemma with many manifestations. 12 1 In such a situation, and in the
security area in general, regimes are particularly difficult to create.
Arms races offer a more specific illustration of the security dilemma:
each state in an arms race spends enormous sums, seeking a temporary
advantage, but all end up less secure than before. 122 States have, how-
ever, made some efforts toward negotiated control of arms races. Ac-
cording to Downs, Rocke and Siverson, the 1922 Washington Naval
Treaty and modern arms control agreements like SALT I and II can be
seen as addressing situations "in which the participants can plausibly be
argued to have Prisoners' Dilemma preferences." 123 Similarly, the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT"), 124 in which non-nuclear-weapon
states renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can be interpreted as
a device to prevent the escalation of arms race PDs into the nuclear
arena. The NPT also addresses a PD among nuclear-weapon states, by
attenuating their commercial and political incentives to compete in mar-
keting destabilizing nuclear materials and technology to non-nuclear-
weapon states.125
PD situations also involve bases of state power other than weapons.
Glenn Snyder, for example, describes a PD competition to expand alli-
ances or political blocs: the creation of offsetting alliances could leave the
major powers with burdensome commitments yet no greater security.
(Once in an alliance, the supporting members face a second PD in decid-
121. See Snyder, "PD" and "Chicken"Models, supra note 114, at 93-94; Gowa, supra note
115, at 175; Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 312-13.
122. See, e.g., Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 120-21, 127-32; H.
HAMBURGER, supra note 100, at 77-79; Snyder, "PD" and "Chicken"Models, supra note 114,
at 68-69, 74-75; Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 13; Wagner, supra note 105, at 340-42.
Arms races can also reflect the games of Deadlock, see supra figure 2, and Stag Hunt, see infra
figure 4.
123. See Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 130.
124. Supra note 24.
125. Id. art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. The NPT also addresses, albeit
indirectly, the ongoing nuclear arms race PD between NATO and the USSR. Id. art. VI, 21
U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
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ing how actively to support the alliance leader. 126) States may enter simi-
lar competitions for territory; Wagner observes that international
boundaries, and the legal rules that maintain them, are in essence devices
to restrain such competition. 127
In the area of economics, predatory "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies
typically reflect the PD.128 Predatory policies include the classic opti-
mum tariff, other strategic trade policies designed to capture rents, com-
petitive exchange rate devaluations, and similar policies designed to alter
capital flows. 129 Many rules of international economic law function to
restrain such measures and thus to avoid the reduction in welfare inher-
ent in mutual defection. Since PD incentives characterize cartels, ar-
rangements such as OPEC, the Arab League boycott, and commodity




Although agreements, rules and regimes restraining defection could
increase state welfare in PD situations, the PD incentives pull inexorably
toward non-cooperation. How is it, then, that such norms are ever cre-
ated, and why are they created in some situations but not in others?
Similarly, why are norms calling for cooperation in PD situations often
observed,13' even though no sovereign enforces them, and why does com-
pliance occur in some situations and not in others? The "supply side" of
modern IR theory has begun to address these questions.
126. See Snyder, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, 36 WORLD POL. 461 (1984)
[hereinafter, Snyder, Security Dilemma].
127. See Wagner, supra note 105, at 330.
128. See Conybeare, Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian,
and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts, 38 WORLD POL. 147, 170 (1985) [hereinafter Conybeare, Trade
Wars].
129. See Abbott, Trading Nation's Dilemma, supra note 32, at 508-10; Conybeare, Public
Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas, supra note 114, at 10, 18-19; P. KRUGMAN, STRATEGIC TRADE
POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOmiCS (1986).
130. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 305, 313 n.12.
131. The general perception is that states disregard international agreements and rules
whenever it advances their immediate interest; international lawyers devote many pages to
rebutting this perception. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 6, at 39-98;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 64, at introductory note to pt. I, ch. 1. Although "occa-
sional, sometimes flagrant violations" undoubtedly occur, see id., examples of compliance are "
also easy to find, see R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 98-106. States do
not, moreover, face a binary choice between compliance and violation: rules can be bent,
reinterpreted, renegotiated or avoided. See id. at 89, 98-99. The empirical question of compli-
ance is thus very difficult to resolve, and the main research to date consists of a few case
studies. See, e.g., F. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 67 (discussing International Crises and Role of





To most authorities, the crucial factor in the emergence of cooperation
is the degree to which an interaction among states will continue over
time.132 To model continued interaction, analysts assume that a game is
played more than once. 133 When a PD game is repeated, the present
benefit a state might see in defection-refusing to join in establishing a
norm-is frequently offset by the lower payoffs it can foresee resulting
from the defection of others in future iterations. In an indefinitely iter-
ated PD game134-- even in a single-play game in which states can repeat-
edly change their moves in response to the actions of others135---egoistic
actors will rationally cooperate. In effect, the prospect of indefinite itera-
tion can change the payoffs on any given play, turning the PD into a
more cooperative game.
Once a norm is established, the costs of defection include the weaken-
ing of that norm: although a single violation will not usually cause the
collapse of a norm or a regime, it may make defections by others more
likely, leading ultimately to the loss of a valuable institution. 136 Because
new norms restraining defection are difficult to create, a state expecting
many future iterations may view a functioning norm as worth preserving,
even if noncompliance might produce a more nearly optimal result in any
given iteration.
137
Cooperation can also emerge and be maintained through "horizontal"
iteration-the linkage of different issue areas. 138 At the time of regime
formation, the linkage of issues through bargaining can make satisfactory
trade-offs possible. 139 Once a regime has formed, linkage makes it possi-
ble for states to respond to cooperation or defection in one area with
appropriate actions in another, much as in an iterated game.
14°
The basic conditions for international cooperation and compliance,
then, are frequently present. Most interactions between states recur in-
132. See, e.g., Oye, supra note 44, at 12-18; Jervis, Security Regimes, supra note 43, at 366;
R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 75.
133. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 930.
134. The influence of repeated play will be stronger if the number of iterations is indefinite.
See Oye, supra note 44, at 13 (incidence of cooperation rises under iterated Prisoners' Di-
lemma); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 100, at 97-102. But see R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION 145-50 (1982).
135. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 931; Wagner, supra note 105, at 332-34.
Again, the effect will be stronger if neither side can predict which move will be the last. See
Wagner, supra note 105, at 332-33.
136. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16,-at 105.
137. See id. at 100, 102.
138. See Srlidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 939; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40,
at 226, 239-41; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 76.
139. See, e.g., Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 130-32 (trade-offs on non-
naval issues made Washington Naval Treaty possible).
140. As each PD situation "becomes embedded in a broader social context .... coopera-
tion is increasingly possible .... " Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 939.
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definitely, because states rarely disappear and similar issues constantly
arise. Regimes in different issue areas are linked in complex ways. States
can often change their moves within a particular game. It is even possi-
ble to structure interactions to increase the degree of iteration. Increas-
ing iteration is an important function of ongoing institutions like regular
U.S. - Soviet summit meetings, regular Western economic summits, and
regular meetings of trade ministers in GATT. Breaking negotiations into
smaller parts also increases the level of iteration.141
Even so, the "shadow of the future"142-the effect of iterated play-
can be longer or shorter depending on several factors. The first is the
weight that states give to future payoffs. A state's time horizon-the
number of iterations it is willing or able to consider-and its discount
rate-the degree to which it values future payoffs less highly-determine
the weight it attaches to future payoffs.' 43 Both elements primarily re-
flect characteristics or decision processes internal to states.
A second important factor in continuing interactions is the relative
magnitude of different payoffs. 44 As Jervis observes, cooperation is
more likely when the cooperative payoffs, CC and CD, are relatively high
and the payoffs for defection, DD and DC, are relatively low. 145 The
intriguing point is that states can act to modify these payoffs and improve
prospects for cooperation. Consider, for example, the American troops
posted in Europe. In the security PD between the United States and the
Soviet Union, these "hostages" lower the potential Soviet DC payoff for
aggression by committing the United States to the defense of Europe. In
the intra-alliance PD among NATO members, these troops reduce the
United States' own potential DC payoff for abandoning its alliance com-
mitments. To take a different example, by permitting important indus-
tries to shrink in response to import competition, visibly diminishing
national self-sufficiency, a state can reduce its DC payoff for violating
liberal international trade rules. Reducing one's own DC payoff, in both
settings, lessens the incentive for defensive defections by others.146 For a
141. See Oye, supra note 44, at 17; Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 181. More
frequent ministerial meetings are currently under negotiation in the GATT. See Ministerial
Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986).
142. See Oye, supra note 44, at 3. The phrase comes from R. AXELROD, supra note 40.
143. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 930-31; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note
40, at 232.
144. In a single-play game, only ordinal payoffs matter: the players simply try for the
highest. In an iterated game, though, players must compare the value of their current choices
with the values of the streams of future payoffs those choices may engender. See Oye, supra
note 44, at 9; Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 46-47; Snidal, Coordination, supra note
41, at 930-31.
145. See Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 171; Oye, supra note 44, at 9.




further example, by limiting oneself to defensive weapons and force pos-
tures, as the Soviet Union is now considering, a state can increase its
rival's potential "sucker's payoff" (CD) and defuse the security
dilemma. 147
International rules and regimes can also modify payoffs. By providing
information, a regime can change the way in which states understand an
issue area. 148 For example, regimes like the GATT and the OECD pub-
lish extensive reports aimed at demonstrating the costs of trade protec-
tion, hoping to modify states' perceptions. In addition, by casting
defection as a legal violation, a regime lowers the payoff for unilateral
defection: the moral and political discomfort of "breaking the law" at
least partially offsets the concrete benefits of defection. Furthermore, by
increasing expectations of cooperative conduct by others, legal rules can
reduce the defensive incentives for defection.1
49
A third set of factors influencing the effect of repeated play concerns
states' perceptions of the certainty of future interactions 150 and of appro-
priate responses by other states. 151 These perceptions too are subject to
modification. Axelrod and others have argued that a policy of condi-
tional cooperation can lead to the emergence of cooperation without the
aid of central institutions. 152 Conditional cooperation means beginning
an interaction by cooperating, but thereafter following a policy of reci-
procity, or "tit-for-tat," returning cooperation for cooperation, defection
for defection. A credible strategy of reciprocity strengthens the link be-
tween present action and future consequences. Most IR scholars see this
strategy as the key to decentralized international cooperation.
5 3 It is
147. See Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 179-80; Oye, supra note 44, at 9-10.
Few weapons are purely defensive, however, and states often disagree about the character of
particular weapons. See Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 138.
148. See Oye, supra note 44, at 11; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 229. If states'
perceptions change sufficiently, the nature of the game can change. If the CC outcome be-
comes more highly valued than DC, for example, PD becomes Stag Hunt, a more cooperative
game. See Oye, supra note 44, at 8. The Stag Hunt game is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 174-88.
149. See Oye, supra note 44, at 11; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at
89-90. For a discussion of the internal political effects of international rules, see Abbott, Trad-
ing Nation's Dilemma, supra note 32, at 522-25.
150. As an extreme example, if a surprise attack could end the game, the future offers
much less incentive to cooperate. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 232-33; Jervis,
Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 172-73; Oye, supra note 44, at 12-13. This possibility
tends to distinguish security issues from areas like economics. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra
note 40, at 232-33.
151. See Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 5; Oye, supra note 44, at 12.
152. See R. AXELROD, supra note 40.
153. See, eg., Oye, supra note 44, at 14; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 244, 249;
Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 4-6. The strategy does, however, have problems,
among them the "echo effect," a mutually reinforcing cycle of defection. See Axelrod & Keo-
hane, supra note 40, at 245.
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also a strategy to which the United States increasingly has turned, espe-
cially in the area of international economics. 154
Norms legitimizing conditional cooperation permeate international
law. The principle of mutual, equivalent commitments and norms of rec-
iprocity in bargaining are crucial to the initiation of cooperation. 155
Once rules or regimes are established, international law permits counter-
measures in response to violations 156 and termination or suspension of
agreements in response to material breaches.' 57 Examples from specific
regimes are also plentiful. To choose one, the GATT authorizes states to
respond to safeguards and the withdrawal of negotiated trade benefits by
withdrawing equivalent concessions, and the GATT contracting parties
can authorize similar countermeasures in response to breaches of regime
rules. 158 All of these rules incorporate the principle of proportionality
inherent in tit-for-tat.
59
Conditional cooperation is, however, a difficult strategy to implement.
Simply determining whether others have cooperated or defected may
pose serious problems. 60 It may be difficult to ascertain the relevant
facts: whether a state has acquired certain weapons, given support to
terrorist groups, waged chemical warfare, or discriminated against for-
eign companies. States planning to defect also have an incentive to dis-
tort or conceal such information. Besides the monitoring problem, the
very meaning of "cooperation" or "defection" may be unclear in many
154. The 1988 trade law, for example, calls for restrictions on the import of telecommuni-
cations products from countries whose markets are found to be closed to such products. Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §§ 1374-1376, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat.
1217-22. See generally Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L OR(. 1
(1986).
155. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXVIII, 61
Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A71, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 276 ("maintain a general level of
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions") [hereinafter GATT]; Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 21, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 337 (reservation modifies
relations of reserving state with other parties, and those of other parties, to the same extent,
with the reserving party) [hereinafter Law of Treaties]; Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36(3), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 (consent to jurisdiction on
basis of reciprocity) [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ].
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 64, § 905 (state injured by violation entitled
to take self-help measures not out of proportion to violation and injury).
157. See Law of Treaties, supra note 155, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346 (material breach
entitles other parties to invoke breach as ground for terminating or suspending operation of
treaty).
158. See GATT, supra note 155, art. XXVIII, 61 Stat. at (pt. 5) A71, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276,
art. XIX, 61 Stat. at (pt. 5) A58, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at (pt.5) A64, 55
U.N.T.S. at 266.
159. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 64, § 905(1)(b), comment d (propor-
tionality of countermeasures). Conybeare suggests, however, that the impact of some of these
rules is reduced by their efforts to constrain retaliation even as they authorize it. See
Conybeare, Trade Wars, supra note 128, at 150-51.
160. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 233-34; Oye, supra note 44, at 15-16;
Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 139-40.
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contexts, as in the disputes between the United States and the Soviet
Union over alleged violations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and
other arms control agreements.16 1 Once a defection has been identified,
moreover, if more than one state is affected, the states may find it difficult
to respond: since retaliation is costly, each state may seek to free-ride on
the actions of others.
International rules, regimes and institutions address many of these
problems. First, many regimes produce large quantities of information
elucidating the situations and actions of their members. 162 Regimes can
also help clarify the meaning of "cooperation" and "defection" by elabo-
rating norms and establishing authoritative, means of interpretation.
163
Monitoring procedures are essential in PD regimes because of the contin-
uing incentives to defect. Non-intrusive techniques such as reporting re-
quirements,I64 "transparency" rules, 165 and consultation obligations,
166
surveillance techniques (the IMF and, increasingly, the GATT), 167 de-
centralized verification procedures (the recent INF Treaty), I68 and cen-
tralized monitoring procedures (IAEA safeguards under the NPT)169-
all contribute to improved monitoring.
When sanctions are necessary, regimes can help overcome free rider
problems by legitimizing and assigning responsibility for retaliation,
1 70
and by providing for collective enforcement.17' The linking or "nesting"
of regimes increases the possibilities for horizontal retaliation. 172 The in-
stitutionalization and formality required for functions like the dissemina-
161. See generally COMPLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL (G. Duffy ed.
1988).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 346-63.
163. See Oye, supra note 44, at 16-17; Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 181;
Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 7.
164. See, e.g., Finlayson & Zacker, The GAT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Re-
gime Dynamics and Functions, 35 INT'L ORG. 561, 587-88 (1981).
165. See, e.g., Agreement on Government Procurement, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Jan. 1, 1981, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Supp. (1980) at 52,
art. IX, T.I.A.S. No. 10403 at 20.
166. See, e.g., Finlayson & Zacker, supra note 164, at 586-87.
167. See, e.g., Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies, in
THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECo-
NOMIC ASPECTS (M. Hilf & E. Petersmann eds. 1988).
168. See Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
Dec. 8, 1987, United States-Soviet Union, arts. IX-XIII, Senate Treaty Doe. No. 100-11, at 74-
80, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 84, 93-97 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty).
169. For discussion of IAEA monitoring, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NU-
CLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 251-65 (1985) [hereinafter NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL].
170. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 155, art. XXVIII, 61 Stat. at (pt. 5) A71, 55 U.N.T.S. at
276.
171. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 235-38; Oye, supra note 44, at 20.
172. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 103-04.
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tion of information, the articulation of standards, monitoring and
enforcement are typical of PD regimes.
173
C. Stag Hunt
Scholars have perhaps devoted disproportionate attention to the PD
game; other games, with quite different characteristics, also epitomize
important situations in international politics. The game of Stag Hunt
(SH), named for a parable told by Rousseau, 174 is shown in figure 4. In
SH, mutual cooperation is the first preference of both players. As in
Harmony, cooperation should emerge with little need for rules and insti-
tutions.175 Yet even this harmonious incentive structure can lead to
"tragic" outcomes in which states fail to achieve the cooperation they
desire.
To attain the desired outcome, every player in the group (here only
two) must cooperate. If one defects, the others will do the same, for
unilateral cooperation brings the sucker's payoff. Unilateral defection,
though, also brings a lower payoff than mutual cooperation; in SH, the
players have no offensive incentive to defect. Why, then, would one de-
fect? Only for defensive reasons: if one suspects that another player is
likely to cease cooperating, defection guarantees that one will at least
avoid the worst outcome.
If every player were confident, then, that all the others shared its un-
derstanding of the game and its preferences, the SH incentive structure
would normally lead to mutual cooperation. Jervis suggests that this
harmonious relationship appears among allies after a major war;176 simi-
lar feelings may have arisen among the Western allies vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. I have elsewhere suggested that the West-
173. Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 923-25, 936-39; see also Stein, Collaboration,
supra note 19, at 311-14.
174. In the parable, all the members of a group of primitive hunters prefer to eat venison.
All must cooperate in order to capture a stag; if one hunter "defects," the stag will escape.
Whenever a hunter sees a hare pass by, however, he is tempted to leave the group and pursue
it. A single hunter can catch a hare, and will eat lightly, but the others, if they continue after
the stag, will not eat at all. If all abandon cooperation and hunt rabbits, all will eat lightly.
Waltz and Jervis use Stag Hunt to illustrate the difficulty of international cooperation. See K.
WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 167; Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 167-68.
Other scholars interpret the story more optimistically. See Oye, supra note 44, at 8; Stein,
Collaboration, supra note 19, at 300-03.
175. See Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 135; Stein, Collaboration, supra
note 19, at 300-03.
176. Jervis, From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation, 38
WORLD POL. 58, 67-68 (1985). According to Jervis, the SH preferences are based on a com-
mon desire to keep the defeated power from rising again. Such unity did not persist after
World War II, perhaps because the divided Germany did not pose a real threat.
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ern embargo of the Soviet bloc reflected SH preferences, at least as to
goods with military applications.
177
Because information about the preferences of others is rarely complete
and correct, however, SH players may often be rationally suspicious: an-
other player may not understand the game, its preferences may change, it
may prefer the security of a DD outcome if it senses evena possibility of
receiving the sucker's payoff, and so on.' 78 Thus the possibility of a fail-
ure of cooperation because of erroneous expectations always exists. The
classic example is an arms race neither party desires, begun when one
state acquires a destabilizing weapon only because it mistakenly believes
that its rival is acquiring it. 179
177. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Trade Controls, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1987) [hereinafter Abbott, Collective Goods]; see also Oye,
supra note 44, at 20-21.
178. See Jervis, Security Dilemma, supra note 43, at 168; Oye, supra note 44, at 8; E.
ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 21, at 123.
179. Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 135.
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As in the PD, iteration of the SH game tends to improve the prospects
for cooperation. A player's record of past cooperation may provide in-
formation about its intention to cooperate in the future. After consider-
ing the undesirable prospect of future defections by others based upon
mistrust, a player may be less inclined to defect in the present in response
to short-term fears or temptations. Conditional cooperation can commu-
nicate both a desire to cooperate and an intention to defect in response to
defections by others. 180
Even in an iterated SH game, though, states may seek to establish in-
ternational rules, regimes and institutions as devices to promote coopera-
tion. Regimes can help ensure that states understand the game and their
interests in cooperation. Even more important, regimes can help states
to convey ongoing assurances of their continued desire to cooperate. 181
The embargo lists and consultation procedures of COCOM serve this
function in the Western strategic embargo of the Soviet bloc. 82 Stein
suggests that extradition treaties provide such assurances for states con-
cerned with reciprocity. 183 Even codification of the principle of pacta
sunt servanda in the Vienna Convention' 84 can be seen as an assurance
device for states desiring mutual compliance with welfare-increasing
agreements.
When the sucker's payoff is very low, as in most security situations,
states are likely to be particularly suspicious and to defect quickly once
they develop doubts concerning the intentions of others. More formal
assurance procedures may therefore be necessary. In this context, meas-
ures like the "hot line," 8 5 the Nuclear Accidents Agreement, 18 6 the Nu-
clear Risk Reduction Centers, 87 and the "confidence-building"
arrangements for notification and verification of troop movements in Eu-
180. See Oye, supra note 44, at 13-15; Wagner, supra note 105, at 335; Axelrod & Keo-
hane, supra note 40, at 244; Downs, Rocke & Siverson, supra note 110, at 142 n.50. The
discussion of conditional cooperation and the shadow of the future in the PD, supra text ac-
companying notes 150-73, is in general applicable here.
181. Stein refers to Stag Hunt as the "assurance game." See Stein, Collaboration, supra
note 19, at 300-03.
182. See Abbott, Collective Goods, supra note 177, at 122.
183. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 304.
184. See supra note 155, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
185. See Agreement on Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link, Sept. 30,
1971, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187,
806 U.N.T.S. 402; Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct
Communications ("Hot-Line") Link, June 20, 1963, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472 U.N.T.S. 163.
186. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept. 30,
1971, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186,
807 U.N.T.S. 57.
,187. See Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Sept. 15,




rope function as devices to avoid "false positives"-erroneous indications
of defection.
Comparative analyses of provisions like these suggest that the incen-
tive structures of particular issue areas influence the forms of interna-
tional regimes.188 PD regimes typically incorporate measures for
external monitoring and verification, and often must be highly institu-
tionalized. SH regimes, in contrast, tend to provide vehicles by which
states can provide information and assurances to each other, usually
through less intrusive institutions. These differences arise from the fact
that, at bottom, PD regimes are designed to restrain states from pursuing
their preferred courses of action, while SH regimes are designed to per-
mit states to pursue them, by providing greater confidence in the cooper-
ation of others.
D. Coordination Games
A simple coordination game-shown with three possible courses of ac-
tion to suggest the complexity of real-world situations-is depicted in
figure 5.189 States in such a situation prefer that all choose the same
course of action-only the coordinated outcomes AA, BB and CC pro-
duce positive payoffs-but they are indifferent as to which of the possible
choices is made. Similar situations are common in everyday life, and can
be annoyingly difficult to resolve if communication is restricted. If the
parties can communicate, however, agreeing on a solution is a simple
matter, since there is no conflict of interest. If play is repeated, conven-
tions are likely to evolve even without communication. Comparative
analysis suggests, then, that the incentive structures of particular issue
areas influence the social choice methods by which norms are adopted as
well as the nature of the norms themselves. To agree on PD regimes, for
example, explicit bargaining is likely to be necessary. In dealing with
coordination problems, however, adaptation and the development of con-
ventions may well suffice. 190
Solutions to simple coordination problems tend to be arbitrary guides
to behavior, like driving on the right-hand side of the road. The Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for example, prescribes
188. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 924-25, 936-41; cf Stein, Collaboration,
supra note 19, at 311-16 (distinguishing regimes requiring "collaboration" versus
"coordination").
189. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 310; Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at
931. For further discussions of coordination problems in various settings, see T. SCHELLING,
STRATEGY, supra note 100, at 69-74, 89-99; D. LEwis, CONVENTION (1969); E. ULLMANN-
MARGALIT, supra note 21, at 78-120.
190. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41; Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 314.
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many such "rules of the road" for international air traffic: emergency
radio frequencies, identification protocols, visual and radio signals and
the like.191 Such rules are of great practical importance, but usually
come to public attention only in connection with disasters such as the
downing of Korean Air Lines flight 007. Once established, they are
largely self-enforcing.
The more complex and interesting type of coordination game is shown
in figure 6. States in such a situation still prefer to coordinate their ac-
tions-the coordinated outcomes AA and BB produce the highest
191. The Air Navigation Committee of ICAO promulgates binding "standards" and non-
binding "recommended practices" on such subjects as telecommunications, markings, and







FIGURE 6: COMPLEX COORDINATION
STATE II
STATE I
payoffs-but they are not indifferent among the possible common
choices: they face a conflict of interest over the exact point of coordina-
tion.192 Agreeing on a solution is therefore more difficult. With a large
number of states or many possible coordination points, bargaining will be
all the more complex; in their efforts to coordinate macroeconomic pol-
icy, for example, the Western democracies must consider the interaction
of numerous policies and policy instruments.193 When the common in-
terest in coordination is strong enough to overcome the diversity of pref-
erences, however, cooperation by convention or agreement is still
possible. Solutions, though, may favor large states, because small states
have a greater incentive to coordinate with them than vice versa; solu-
tions may also favor the states that first establish a practice.
194
Once a coordination regime is established, it will again tend to be self-
enforcing; normally, a state can only hurt itself by deviating from the
192. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 309-11; Snidal, Coordination, supra note
41, at 931-32.
193. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 932-34.
194. See id. at 932, 934-36; cf Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 313-16 (discussing
forms of cooperation in coordination settings).
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agreed solution. Surprisingly, iteration actually may make a solution
somewhat less stable and may increase the influence of large states on the
solution: the prospect of future interactions may create an incentive for a
large state to deviate, or threaten to do so, in an effort to shift the solu-
tion to its preferred point. Even in iterated settings, though, coordina-
tion is remarkably stable. 195 Complex coordination regimes, then, rarely
require elaborate institutions for conveying assurances, monitoring or en-
forcing compliance. Such regimes are typically designed to facilitate bar-
gaining, to spell out and interpret agreed norms, to provide information,
and to act as a forum for communication.
196
The ICAO again provides an apt example of a complex coordination
regime. It requires that all member states provide English-speaking air
traffic controllers, resolving a need for a common medium of expression,
even though all states would prefer to operate only in their native
tongues and several would have a plausible case for the use of their lan-
guages as the linguafranca. The private convention by which the dollar
is used as the unit of account in much international trade carries out a
similar function; the more formal regime establishing the European Cur-
rency Unit sidesteps powerful conflicts of interest by creating a new coor-
dination point. Common railroad gauges, telecommunications
standards, and specifications for weapons used by allied armed forces are
all designed to solve coordination problems.'
97
The GATT code standardizing customs valuation methods deals at
least in part with a coordination problem. Some of its institutional provi-
sions are typical of coordination regimes: the code establishes a Techni-
cal Committee, affiliated with the Customs Cooperation Council, to
elaborate and interpret its rules and facilitate communication on techni-
cal problems. 198 Treaties harmonizing aspects of international commer-
cial law address coordination problems faced by private traders.' 99 The
European Economic Community, in its efforts to forge a unified market,
must create many coordination norms and regimes.
195. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 936, 939; Stein, Collaboration, supra note
19, at 314.
196. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 932, 937-38; Stein, Collaboration, supra
note 19, at 313-16.
197. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 41, at 932; Taylor, Weapons Standardization in
NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic Competition?, 36 INT'L ORG. 95 (1982); Stein, Col-
laboration, supra note 19, at 314-15 (examples of coordination standards).
198. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 116 (26th Supp.)
(1980) at 127-28, T.I.A.S. No. 10402.
199. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of




Game models are valuable tools for scholars seeking to explore the
strategic interaction of rational states and the influence of structural in-
centives. This section has presented several important game models,
ranging from the purely harmonious to the purely conflictual. It has
concentrated on games like PD, SH and complex coordination in which
rational egoistic states simultaneously face incentives for cooperation and
for self-interested independent action.
In these mixed-motive games, international rules, regimes and institu-
tions can substantially affect outcomes. By the same token, the incentive
structure of mixed-motive games may lead states to create and comply
with international norms in order to attain the higher payoffs available
through cooperation. Yet the incentive structure of such games makes
cooperation inherently difficult. Modern.IR theory has begun to identify
factors and strategies like iteration, conditional cooperation, the provi-
sion of information and the modification of payoffs that encourage coop-
erative outcomes in mixed-motive settings. These factors and strategies
are important subjects for further study.
IV. Political Market Failure
A. The Market Analogy
International politics can be studied by analogy to other decentralized
social orders as well as through abstract game models. Some primitive
"stateless societies," for example, show "striking similarities" to the envi-
ronment in which states interact in international politics.2°° The most
fruitful analogue to date, however, has been the market.201 Like firms in
a market, rational self-interested states interact in an effort to improve
their own welfare on political, military and economic issues, more or less
impersonally, in a decentralized arena. The structure of their interac-
tions, however, constrains their conduct, much as the nature of the mar-
ket in which firms operate shapes their behavior.2 02 Moreover, since
international politics resembles the interdependent conditions of oligop-
200. Masters, World Politics as a Primitive Political System, 16 WORLD POL. 595, 604
(1964); see also id. at 597-99, 604-08; Dinstein, International Law as a Primitive Legal System,
19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1986); L. MAIR, PRIMITIVE GOVERNMENT (1977).
201. See Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 14, at 191; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEM-
ONY, supra note 16, at 27; K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 89-93.
202. See Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 14, at 190-91; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HE-
GEMONY, supra note 16, at 27. Relational analysis may shed light on less impersonal interac-
tions. See Gottleib, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
567 (1983).
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oly, the expected behavior of others normally influences the conduct of
states.203
IR scholars have only begun to exploit the analytical possibilities of
the market analogy. As the growth of law and economics has demon-
strated, fundamental economic ideas, like the inverse relationship of de-
mand to price, have extraordinarily broad application. The theory
described in this section draws on one of those ideas, the concept of
"market failure": 2°4 when certain structural features are present, mar-
kets do not produce the efficient, harmonious results attributed to the
hypothetical perfect market.
Snidal, Keohane, Conybeare, Russett and other scholars have begun to
identify similar structural features in international relations, interpreting
them as political market failures. This section discusses two of the most
important-collective goods and externalities. Analysis of collective
goods and externalities in international politics sheds light on many
sources of international disharmony and on the "conscious institutional
innovation" by which states seek to overcome market failure.
205
Some may object that the market analogy is inappropriate, since famil-
iar economic markets are grounded on property rights, rules against
force and fraud, and other "governmentally contrived limitations" 20 6 en-
forceable through coercion if necessary, all features that are seemingly
absent from international politics. A weak institutional framework, how-
ever, characterizes any market evolving beyond the effective reach of
government, as in the American West. 20 7 Participants in such a market
must create the necessary institutional framework through unregulated
203. See Snidal, Game Theory,'supra note 41, at 25, 31-32; ECONOMIC THEORIES OF IN-
TERNATIONAL POLITICS 131-37 (B. Russett ed. 1968); R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 28-29; K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 116-28.
204. For a summary of the most important sources of market failure, see W. BAUMOL &
A. BLINDER, supra note 92, at 536-52. The technical definitions and modes of analysis utilized
by economists interested in market failure may be less suitable for the study of international
relations, where political ard institutional factors are more critical. See Snidal, Public Goods,
Property Rights and Political Organizations, 23 INT'L STUD. Q. 532, 532-33 (1979) [hereinafter
Snidal, Public goods, Property Rights].
205. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 51-54, 76-78, 82-83; c. W.
RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 3 (common interest in improving social outcome
by eliminating externalities).
206. K. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 33, at 91.
207. See, e.g., Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J.
LAW & ECON. 421 (1977); Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 163 (1975). In any case, international law does include a
rudimentary system of property rights, based on such principles as state sovereignty and terri-
torial jurisdiction, and rules limiting resort to force. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE,




and unassisted market transactions. The same process on an interna-
tional scale is a major focus of modern IR theory.
B. Collective Goods
1. Demand
Public or collective goods ("CGs") are among the most significant
forms of market failure in international politics. 208 In their pure form,
CGs share two characteristics not found in ordinary private goods: joint-
ness of supply and non-excludability.
20 9
Jointness means that consumption of a .CG by one user does not re-
duce the amount available for others; all potential consumers can benefit
from production of the good.210 In the absence of a sovereign, however,
a CG will only be provided if its beneficiaries bear the costs of its produc-
tion. Although a single state may sometimes find it worthwhile to cover
those costs, they often will exceed the benefit any one state stands to
receive. Provision of a CG will then require- collective action.
211
Non-excludability means that states who do not contribute to the pro-
duction of a CG cannot be prevented from consuming it.212 As a result,
each potential beneficiary has an incentive not to contribute, perhaps dis-
guising its true interest in the good, in an effort to free-ride on the contri-
butions of others.213 The incentives facing CG beneficiaries correspond
closely to those of the PD game. 214 "Jointness of supply is the carrot,
making cooperative-collective decisions beneficial to all, absence of the
208. For valuable discussions of public goods and international politics, see Russett & Sul-
livan, Collective Goods and International Organization, 25 INT'L ORG. 845 (1971); Stein, Col-
laboration, supra note 19, at 307-08; Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41; Snidal, Public Goods,
Property Rights, supra note 204; Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas, supra note
114.
209. See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 92, at 543-44; D. MUELLER, supra note
65, at 13.
210. See Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners'Dilemmas, supra note 114, at 6; W. RIKER &
P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 260. The extreme case is a good actually consumed in equal
quantities by all members of the relevant class. See id. at 247, 259-60. This case is rare in
practice. See id. at 264-65. Most joint goodi actually exhibit some degree of rivalry. An
important example is the "crowdable" CG, where rivalry appears at a certain level of crowd-
ing, as in a national park. See M. TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION 15 (1976).
211. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 250-51; D. MUELLER, supra note
65, at 13.
212. See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 92, at 544.
213. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 250-52; D. MUELLER, supra note
65, at 13; Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas, supra note 114, at 6. A state can
expect to free-ride only if it believes that the good will be supplied without its participation and,
that it will not be excluded from enjoying the good. See M. TAYLOR, supra note 210, at 15.
214. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 250-52; Hardin, Collective Action
as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma, 16 BEHAV. Sci. 472 (1971); Conybeare, Public Goods,
Prisoners'Dilemmas, supra note 114, at 6. Many PD games do not involve CGs, however. See
id. at 6-8; Snidal, Public Goods, Property Rights, supra note 204, at 541.
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exclusion principle the apple tempting individuals into independent non-
cooperative behavior.
'215
The characteristics of CGs lead to two undesirable results. The first is
a problem of resource allocation: because of free-riding, CGs are typi-
cally supplied at less than optimal levels, if at all.216 The second is a
problem of distribution: when some beneficiaries are able to free-ride,
those who contribute may feel exploited and seek to redistribute the bur-
den, creating political conflict.
217
Groups of beneficiary states seeking to produce a CG and contributor
states seeking to reallocate costs can follow a variety of strategies. 218
Often, though, they will seek to create international rules, regimes and
institutions designed to ensure an equitable sharing of costs. As with PD
regimes, some scholars have advanced much the same line of reasoning
to explain the origin of the state.2
19
Common spaces or resources ("commons") present a variant of the
usual CG situation.220 A commons is a CG that already exists. Many
commons, however, are jointly consumable only up to a certain level of
use. With more intense use, they become "crowdable," like a highway,
or exhaustible, like a pool of oil; their value is reduced and possibly extin-
guished. 22' There are no means of excluding users as the critical point is
approached, although even then each user may find it worthwhile to fur-
ther increase its level of exploitation. The "tragedy of the commons" is
the overuse and consequent destruction of a valued CG through individ-
215. D. MUELLER, supra note 65, at 14.
216. This problem was elaborated by Mancur Olson, who argued that CG incentives make
it difficult to form any large voluntary organization. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION (1965); see also Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas, supra note 114,
at 6; W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 247, 250-52. A collective "bad," like air
pollution, will typically be oversupplied because its producers do not bear its costs,
217. See Russett & Sullivan, supra note 208, at 852.
218. See infra note 245.
219. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 307-08; M. TAYLOR, supra note 210, at v,
3, 99-116 (discussing Hobbes' LEVIATHAN); cf J. BUCHANAN, supra note 119, at 35-52.
220. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sm. 1243 (1968). Commons problems
have received considerable attention from IR and IL scholars. See, e.g., B. RUSSETr & H.
STARR, supra note 96, at 514-16; Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 313; THE NEW NA-
TIONALISM AND COMMON SPACES (J. Charney ed. 1984). Taylor asserts that the attention
given to the commons paradigm has stemmed mainly from its importance in understanding
environmental problems, see M. TAYLOR, supra note 210, at 1-3, but it is also useful in analyz-
ing a wide range of issues, not all of which are concerned with the environment narrowly
defined. See, e.g., S. BROWN, N. CORNELL, L. FABIAN & E. WEISS, REGIMES FOR THE
OCEAN, OUTER SPACE, AND WEATHER (1977) [hereinafter S. BROWN]; MANAGING THE
COMMONS (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977).
221. See supra, note 210; W. Riker & P. Ordeshook, supra note 53, at 264-65; T. SCHEL-




ually rational actions, the affirmative equivalent of free-riding. 222 In this
situation, rational states will often seek to create regimes to restrain ex-
ploitation and to preserve the commons.
223
2. CGs in International Politics
CGs, and regimes designed to produce them, are usefully categorized
by their degree of jointness, that is, according to the types and numbers
of states or other actors that perceive them as desirable. Some goods are
widely, even universally seen as beneficial. These goods are general CGs.
A regime under which effective sanctions could be invoked against states
that commit aggression or breach the peace, for example, might be a
general CG: virtually all states would realize increased security from the
regime's deterrent effect. Chapter VII of'the U.N. Charter was intended
to constitute just such a regime.224 The Charter regime has manifested
severe free-rider problems, however-reflecting the costs of participation
in collective sanctions-and it has greatly underproduced the good of
collective security.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can also be seen as producing a
general CG: limiting the spread of nuclear weapons increases the secur-
ity of all states. Important nuclear- and near-nuclear-weapon state hold-
outs, however, have also weakened the NPT regime. These states can be
seen as defectors or free-riders, enjoying the greater security the regime
offers while maintaining their own power; however, it may be more ap-
propriate to interpret their actions in terms of their own peculiar situa-
tions, most of which evoke the security dilemma and override their
interest in a general CG.
225
Olson and Zeckhauser note that "almost all kinds of organizations
provide public or collective goods.... Collective goods are ... the char-
acteristic outputs not only of governments but of organizations in gen-
eral."' 226 Much of the work of international organizations, then, can be
222. See B. RUSSETT & H. STARR, supra note 96, at 514-15. The commons problem can
also be analyzed as the failure to produce a CG, Le., the continued availability of the com-
mons, because individuals refuse to contribute to its production by restraining their use. See
M. TAYLOR, supra note 210, at 3-4. Since commons reflect CG problems, they also share the
incentive structure of the PD. See T. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES, supra note 221, at 110-11;
Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 313.
223. See Stein, Collaboration, supra note 19, at 311-13.
224. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. For a similar regional sanctions regime, see the Inter-Amer-
ican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3 (self-defense against armed attack),
art. 6 (response to situations endangering peace), 62 Stat. 1681, 1700-01, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21
U.N.T.S. 77, 95-99.
225. See NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, supra note 169, at 244, 265-71.
226. Olson & Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory ofAlliances, 48 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS
3 (1966), reprinted in ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 25-26 (B. Russett
ed. 1968).
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interpreted as the provision of general CGs.227 The U.N. General As-
sembly, for example, provides virtually every nation with a forum for
communication and political activity.228 Efforts by the Secretary-Gen-
eral to resolve regional disputes increase the security of all states inter-
ested in the region or in the general peace. Other U.N. agencies, and
non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross, provide more spe-
cialized CGs.229 Like their domestic counterparts, however, many inter-
national organizations suffer from severe free-rider problems (especially
the refusal to pay dues), from dissatisfaction by states paying large
shares, and even-as in the case of UNESCO-from disagreement over
the jointness of the goods they produce.
230
Many international commons can be regarded as general CGs. Exam-
ples include the oceans (fish, whales and other marine life, .navigation
routes, seabed minerals, sites for dumping waste, and other ocean re-
sources); Antarctica; the atmosphere; the ozone layer; outer 'space; the
moon and other celestial bodies; geostationary orbits; and the frequencies
of the radio spectrum. 231 In recent decades, technological advances and
the demands of new users have begun to make over-exploitation of these
commons a serious problem. A number of commons regimes have been
put into place and others have been proposed.
232
Many of these regimes first seek to establish or maintain the status of
an area as a commons to guard against a perceived threat of national
appropriation. The Law of the Sea Treaty, for example, reflecting prior
conventions and customary law, keeps the high seas "open to all states,"
and provides that no state may validly subject any part of them to its
227. See, e.g., B. RUSSETT & H, STARR, supra note 96, at 509-32.
228. See generally M. PETERSON, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WORLD POLITICS (1986).
229. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) promotes humanitarian law
for armed conflicts, a benefit to any nation that might take part in such a conflict. More recent
ICRC activities may be seen as undesirable by certain states. See Armstrong, The ICRC and
Political Prisoners, 39 INT'L ORG. 615 (1985).
230. See B. RussETr & H. STARR, supra note 96, at 511; Russett & Sullivan, supra note
208, at 853.
231. For discussions of these and other commons, see, e.g., sources cited in note 220;
Wijkman, Managing the Global Commons, 36 INT'L ORG. 511 (1982); Laver, Public, Private
and Common in Outer Space: Res Extra Commercium or Res Communis Humanitatis Beyond
the High Frontier, 34 POL. STUD. 359 (1986); Soroos, The Commons in the Sky: The Radio
Spectrum and Geosynchronous Orbit as Issues in Global Policy, 36 INT'L ORG. 665 (1982); S.
KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST GLOBAL LIBERALISM
227-64 (1985).
Seabed minerals are not truly joint: minerals mined by one state cannot also be enjoyed by
another. They are simply so abundant that the total supply appears joint. The "highways" on
the high seas are closer to the technical definition ofjointness, although crowdable. See Snidal,
HS Theory, supra note 41, at 595-97; R. HARDIN, supra note 134, at 17-18.
232. See S. BROWN, supra note 220, at 8-18; Wijkman, supra note 231, at 526-35; Soroos,




sovereignty. 233 Yet the commons regimes also attempt to prevent over-
exploitation and otherwise regulate use. The Law of the Sea Treaty
reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes, for example, and imposes
other restrictions, including obligations to conserve living resources and
to control pollution.234 Other conventions also mandate regulation of
ocean pollution.235 The Antarctic Treaty and related conventions set
limits on exploitation of certain living resources.
236
Some commons have even been placed, or have been proposed to be
placed, under supranational management, 237 to an extent well beyond the
limited powers traditionally granted commissions charged with manag-
ing joint rivers and lakes.238 The most elaborate conception, of course, is
the seabed mining portion of the Law of the Sea Treaty.239 This interest
in international management has been linked with the concept that cer-
tain spaces and resources are the "common" heritage of mankind," to be
managed by supranational authorities for the benefit of the entire world
community, particularly those states not currently capable of exploiting
the resources for themselves. 24° Although the commons themselves are
seen as general CGs, conflict over use and governance between developed
233. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 87, 89, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. -1261, 1286, 1287 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the
Sea]; if id. art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1280 (similar navigation rights in exclusive economic zone).
The treaty also attempts to preserve other joint "highways" through the regimes of innocent
passage and transit passage. See id. arts. 17-32, 21 I.L.M. at 1273-76 (innocent passage), 37-
44, 21 I.L.M. at 1276-78 (transit passage); cf. arts. 52-53, 21 I.L.M. at 1279-80 (archipelagic
waters); Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 596-97. As another example, the Antarctic
Treaty freezes conflicting territorial claims and preserves the continent for common use, at
least for certain purposes, notably scientific research. See S. KRASNER, supra note 231, at 250-
62; Wijkman, supra note 231, at 532-33.
234. Law'of the Sea, supra note 233, art. 88, 21 I.L.M. at 1287 (peaceful purposes), arts.
116-20, 21 I.L.M. at 1290-91 (living resources), arts. 192-237, 21 I.L.M. at 1308-16 (pollution).
235. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
236. See S. KRASNER, supra note 231, at 255-57.
237. See Wijkman, supra note 231, at 513, 519-21, 522.
238. See Kiss, The International Protection of the Environment, in STRUCTURE AND PRO-
CESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 1069, 1080.
239. See Law of the Sea, supra note 233, arts. 133-91, 21 I.L.M. at 1293-1308. The Inter-
national Telegraph Union (ITU) has also been urged to reserve space on the radio spectrum
for the future needs of developing nations, rather than allocating frequencies at the request of
states. See Soroos, supra note 231, at 672-74; Laver, supra note 231, at 369-71.
240. This association is widely understood, even where no specific institution has formally
been proposed, as in the developing nation proposals for a new Antarctic regime. See S.
KRASNER, supra note 231, at 227-28; Laver, supra note 231, at 363-67; Soroos, supra note 231,
at 668; see also Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (nos. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc.
A/34/664, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979); G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
30) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 422 (1970) (moratorium resolution
on seabed mining, reserving seabed and subsoil thereof exclusively for use in interests of
mankind).
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and developing nations has impeded progress on virtually all commons
issues.2
41
Other goods and regimes are seen as beneficial by certain states but as
neutral or undesirable by others. These goods and regimes are partial
CGs. 242 The clearest example is an alliance like NATO, explicitly
designed to strengthen its members at the expense of its rivals. Interest-
ingly, though, to the extent alliances promote peace and stability, as
through deterrence, they benefit all states-much like arms control and
confidence-building agreements between the superpowers or other mili-
tary rivals-and function as general CGs. (CG incentives also operate
among alliance members; according to Olson and Zeckhauser, alliances
tend to produce sub-optimal amounts of defense, with larger states bear-
ing a disproportionate share of the costs. 243 The prominent disputes over
burden sharing between the United States and its allies in Europe and
Japan reflect the incentives identified by CG analysis.)
States can also disagree over the jointness of particular goods. From
the neoclassical perspective, a liberal trade regime like the GATT pro-
duces the joint good of increased prosperity; from a mercantilist or
"dependencia" perspective, however, the regime appears less clearly
joint.244 Similarly, many see a regime for the protection of intellectual
property as a general CG, encouraging innovation and the free circula-
tion of new creations; others see such a regime in zero-sum terms, as a
legal mechanism functioning to transfer wealth to technologically ad-
vanced countries. Some see the United States as providing CGs-while
other developed states free-ride-when it applies economic (and occa-
sionally military) sanctions against states that support terrorists, violate
human rights, commit aggression and the like. Other nations argue,
however, that they simply disagree with the United States as to the desir-
ability of particular actions.245 In all such cases, the incentive to disguise
one's preferences greatly complicates the dispute.
241. For a provocative analysis of the North-South commons debate, see S. KRASNER,
supra note 231.
242. See Russett & Sullivan, supra note 208, at 848.
243. See Olson & Zeckhauser, supra note 226, at 27-28. The situation can change, though,
if alliances also provide valuable private goods, such as armaments available for purely na-
tional military purposes. See Comes & Sandier, Easy Riders, Joint Production and Public
Goods, 94 ECON. J. 580, 594 (1984).
244. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 595-96.
245. See Abbott, Collective Goods, supra note 177, at 123-27. In an effort to redistribute
the burden of sanctions, the United States has pursued a number of unilateral strategies, in-
cluding persuasion, coercion (under the Battle Act, for example), side payments, and extrater-
ritorial trade controls. See id. at 126-27. The Battle Act authorized the State Department to
terminate military and economic assistance to any nation that did not cooperate in the U.S.
embargo of the Soviet Union. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Pub. L. No.
213 §§ 101-05, 201-03, 301-05, 65 Stat. 644. It was superseded in 1979 by the Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2416(e) (1982). For a discussion of unilateral strategies, see
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As Snidal and Russett have suggested, it may be dangerous to apply
CG theory to particular issue areas or regimes without carefully consid-
ering the jointness of the goods in question. 246 Charles Kindleberger, for
example, in discussing liberal economic regimes, has asserted that in-
tangibles like stability and leadership, or the existence of a regime as
such, should be regarded as international CGs. This insight has led to
the development of an important branch of modern IR theory.247 Em-
phasis on the universality of a regime's benefits may well be correct when
the alternative to leadership or the creation of an international regime is
a crisis like the Great Depression (the subject of Kindleberger's seminal
work). If followed inappropriately, however, Kindleberger's insight may
lead the analyst to ignore the characteristics of the particular goods pro-
duced by a regime and to overstate the community benefits the regime
provides. 248
3. Supply
Like PD situations, CGs pose particularly difficult problems of inter-
national cooperation. How are states able to produce CGs or create CG
regimes, and why do states comply with the dictates of such regimes, in
the face of the underlying incentive to free-ride? Modern IR theory has
considered two explanations.
The first explanation turns on the fact that CGs can be supplied even
without widespread cooperation whenever a single state is willing to bear
the associated costs. Out of a variety of motives, states large and small
regularly provide important CGs. For example, Norway often supplies
troops for peacekeeping operations, and Switzerland and Sweden provide
neutral sites for international arbitrations and conferences; the United
States has voluntarily shared data on world weather systems.249 Modern
IR theorists have devoted particular attention to developing Olson's in-
sight that a CG beneficiary large enough to realize benefits from produc-
tion of a good greater than its total costs should be willing to bear those
costs itself, providing the CG for the entire beneficiary group.
Crawford & Lenway, Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collabora-
tion on East-West Trade, 37 WORLD POL. 375, 380-82 (1985).
246. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 590-93, 595-97; Russett, The Mysterious
Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?, 39 INT'L ORG. 207, 222-28
(1985) [hereinafter Russett, Vanishing Hegemony].
247. See infra text accompanying notes 250-62.
248. See C. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929-1939 28 (leadership),
305 (stability), 307 (responsibility) (1973); Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 591; Lake,
International Economic Structure and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934, 35
WORLD POL. 517, 519 (1983) (Kindleberger stresses CG of stability).
249. See Ruggie, Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration, 66 AM. POL.
Scr. REV. 874, 889 (1972).
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Hegemonic stability ("HS") theory,250 the line of theory elaborating
Olson's insight, asserts that CG regimes will be created-in the strong
form of the theory, will only be created-when a "hegemonic" state, like
the United States after World War II, is willing to bear the costs. As the
hegemon declines, by the same token, the regimes it has sponsored will
tend to weaken. 25' Two important associations among historical events
support HS theory: during British (mid-19th century) and American
(mid-20th century) hegemony, the world saw the only relatively liberal
free trade regimes in modern history;252 during the 1920's the decline of
British hegemony and the failure of American leadership-in Kin-
dleberger's interpretation-led to the collapse of an open world economy
and the Great Depression.2 53
Even if one assumes that a hegemonic state will only support regimes
from which it stands to benefit,25 4 HS theory has startling implications.
Far from exploiting smaller states, the actions of a hegemon in promot-
ing regimes that provide CGs should benefit those states, perhaps even
more than they benefit the hegemon itself.255 Other states should wel-
come the hegemon's leadership and support the regimes it sponsors. As
Haggard and Simmons observe, this result "turns realism on its head" by
suggesting that the small may sometimes exploit the powerful.256
Hegemonic states will be unable to produce many CGs unilaterally.
Taking free trade to be a CG, for example, a hegemon will only be able to
250. For discussions of HS theory, see R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16,
at 31-46; Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41; Stein, Hegemon's Dilemma, supra note 42, at 355-
56.
251. See Keohane, Theory of Hegemonic Stability, supra note 19, at 143; cf R. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 31 ("maintenance of order requires continued
hegemony").
252. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 581; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 31, 34-37 (noting, however, tenuous causal link between British hegemony
and cooperative relations). See generally Kindleberger, Systems, supra note 93, at 32; Stein,
Hegemon's Dilemma, supra note 42, at 385; Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 581.
253. See C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 253; Kindleberger, Systems, supra note 93, at 34-
35.
254. Kindleberger suggests that a hegemonic state should act altruistically. See Kin-
dleberger, Systems, supra note 93, at 18-20; Lake, supra note 248, at 519.
255. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 581-83.
256. Haggard & Simmons, supra note 18, at 502. Darker views of hegemony also appear
in IR theory. Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin, for example, argue that the regimes a
hegemon supports in its own interest may or may not benefit others. See R. GILPIN, U.S,
POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 84-85 (1975); Krasner, State Power and
the Structure of International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317, 322-23 (1976) [hereinafter Krasner,
State Power]; see also Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 586; Stein, Hegemon's Dilemma,
supra note 42, at 356-57; Lake, supra note 248, at 520. According to Snidal, Gilpin's analysis
implies that hegemonic states can coerce contributions from weaker states, making it uncertain
how net benefits will flow. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 587-88. These views of




open its own markets, not those of others. Yet a free trade regime can
only be said to exist with the participation of a significant number of
states. In these circumstances, leadership, including example, persua-
sion, assistance and other techniques of the political entrepreneur, is an
important hegemonic tool. 257 Coercive tactics may be available, espe-
cially against weaker states, but they are too costly to use on a large
scale.258 In many cases, Stein and others argue, the hegemon will have to
purchase cooperation by making concessions and compromises, ac-
cepting an asymmetric bargain that shifts even greater benefits to others.
In this view, for example, the United States secured support for the
GATT by agreeing to exceptions for British Commonwealth trade pref-
erences, customs unions and balance of payments measures, and other
provisions that legitimated discrimination against American exports.
2 59
Today, as U.S. hegemony has declined, the asymmetric bargain has be-
come less tolerable, and American trade policy has come to focus on
opening foreign markets. 2
6°
HS theory has inspired a number of studies, many of them critical.261
While such studies suggest the need for further refinement, to this ob-
server HS theory remains a valuable component of a theory of interna-
tional cooperation.
262
A second strand of theory analyzes how states can cooperate to pro-
duce CGs even in the absence of a hegemon. Work along this line has
been inspired, on the one hand, by concern over the erosion of American
257. See R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 137-38, 182. Timothy Mc-
Keown notes that some theorists liken the hegemon to a political entrepreneur. See McKe-
own, Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe, 37 INT'L ORG. 73,
74 (1983). On the concept of political entrepreneurship, see N. FROHLICH, J. OPPENHEIMER
& 0. YOUNG, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE GOODS (1971).
258. See Stein, Hegemon's Dilemma, supra note 42, at 358, 364 & n.21; Crawford &
Lenway, supra note 245, at 381-82.
259. See Stein, Hegemon's Dilemma, supra note 42, at 364; Lipson, Transformation of
Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change, 36 INT'L ORG. 417, 419, 440 (1982) (dis-
proportionate tariff concessions by United States to secure implementation of GATT; dispro-
portionate concessions to secure admission of Japan to GATT) [hereinafter Lipson,
Transformation of Trade]; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 139. Regard-
ing the hegemon's recourse to bribery rather than coercion, see McKeown, supra note 257, at
74.
260. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 301, (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982)).
261. Stein, McKeown and Lawson, for example, have found discrepancies between the
actions of hegemonic states and the predictions of the theory; Krasner has found similar dis-
crepancies in historical trading patterns. See Stein, Hegemon's Dilemma, supra note 42, 360-
63, 367-72; McKeown, supra note 257, at 80-89; Lawson, Hegemony and the Structure of
International Trade Reassessed: A View from Arabia, 37 INT'L ORG. 317 (1983); Krasner, State
Power, supra note 256, at 335-41. Cowhey and Long have argued that a theory emphasizing
economics and domestic politics better explains protection in a particular industry. Cowhey &
Long, Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?, 37 INT'L
ORG. 157 (1983).
262. For a similar view, see Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 612-14.
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dominance, especially as it might affect the liberal postwar economic re-
gimes, and on the other hand, by the unexpected strength of some of
those regimes in the face of apparent American decline.
2 63
One important element in this developing theory is the possibility that
noncontributors can be excluded from the benefits of a CG.264 Exclusion
is almost never literally impossible, as the technical definition of a pure
CG would suggest.265 It is most often merely difficult or costly-because
of the characteristics of particular goods or inadequate institutional ar-
rangements-or in conflict with some other policy. In practice, then, CO
regimes can frequently provide for exclusion, reducing the incentive to
free-ride.2 66 The stress on exclusion that this analysis encourages is at
odds with the traditional concern of IL theory for universality of rules.
2 67
It does, however conform with current trends in state practice;2 68 indeed,
it may help explain the increasing prominence of international
agreements.
Keohane discusses the exclusionary devices in three prominent re-
gimes: (1) only members of the International Energy Agency are entitled
to receive oil under the Agency's emergency sharing program; (2) only
members of the IMF are eligible to borrow from the Fund; and (3) only
members of the GATT are entitled to most-favored-natiin treatment by
other members. 269 The trade regime is a particularly good example, for
it has increasingly been structured to allow exclusion, perhaps in propor-
tion to the erosion of American dominance. The benefits of the Tokyo
Round codes, for example, are available only to signatories; 270 the same
is likely to be true of agreements reached in the Uruguay Round. Special
trade arrangements like the recent U.S.-Canada free trade agreement are
of growing importance, and interest in a "GATT Plus," limited to states
willing to make greater commitments, regularly recurs. Exclusion is also
263. See Keohane, Theory of Hegemonic Stability, supra note 19, at 143-54; R. KEOHANE,
AFrTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 182-216; Lipson, Transformation of Trade, supra note
259, at 419-23. It could be that the postwar regimes have remained stronger than expected
because the decline in U.S. power has been exaggerated. See Russett, Vanishing Hegemony,
supra note 246, at 207; Strange, The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony, 41 INT'L ORG. 551
(1987). Snidal also argues that, in theory, it is the hegemon's absolute size that leads it provide
a CG; unless the hegemonic state shrinks absolutely, it should still be willing to provide it. See
Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 588-90.
264. See Snidal, Public Goods, Property Rights, supra note 204, at 540-41.
265. See Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 355 n.3 (1984) ("if literal
nonexcludability is required, it is hard to imagine a good that qualifies").
266. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 592. These arrangements may, however,
limit the amount of a CG that can be produced.
267. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 64, § 101, comment d.
268. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 592-93.
269. R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 77-78.
270. See Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored.
Nation Principle, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59 (1980).
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an important strategy for states that seek to redistribute the burdens of
providing CGs. It may be possible, for example, to exclude free-riders
from an alliance like NATO; withdrawal, like that of the United States
from the ANZUS treaty vis-A-vis New Zealand, also functions as a form
of exclusion.
27 1
Exclusion has been the most dramatic strategy for protecting interna-
tional commons: many common areas and resources have been allocated
among interested states. The most conspicuous examples are the conti-
nental shelf, the broadened territorial sea, and the exclusive economic
zone.272 These "enclosure" regimes place most of the exploitable re-
sources of the oceans within the control of coastal states. By protecting
those resources from the tragedy of the commons, such regimes should
make for more efficient use of the resources. The regimes carry massive
distributional consequences, however, that in some respects overshadow
their effects on resource allocation: they greatly favor states with long
coastlines in areas with abundant marine life, many of which are highly
developed.
273
A second important element in the theory of non-hegemonic coopera-
tion for the production of CGs without the presence of a hegemonic
state-emphasized by Snidal and based on work by Olson, Hardin, Tay-
lor and others-is the enhanced likelihood of cooperation among rela-
tively small groups of states, like those that characterize many
international interactions.274 Cooperation in small groups depends first
on the ability of states to consider the long-run effects of their actions.
275
When the beneficiaries of a CG number only a few, participation by each
271. Snyder notes that "abandonment" by an important ally is a major concern for mem-
bers of an alliance. Given the U.S. - Soviet rivalry, however, abandonment of significant west-
ern allies is unlikely. See Snyder, Security Dilemma, supra note 126, at 466-67, 483-89.
Exclusion, in other words, is difficult.
272. See Law of the Sea, supra note 233, arts. 3-16, 21 I.L.M. at 1272-73 (territorial sea),
55-75, 21 I.L.M. at 1280-84 (exclusive economic zone), 76-85, 21 I.L.M. at 1285-86 (continen-
tal shelf).
273. See S. KRASNER, supra note 231, at 235-41; Wijkman, supra note 231, at 527-30.
Krasner argues that developing countries have generally sought to create regimes that legiti-
mate authoritative allocation of resources rather than market control. Because their aim is
primarily to increase their own political strength, they will support regimes promising greater
control even at the expense of greater wealth. The South's support for exclusionary ocean
regimes that allocate rich resources to states like the United States and Canada tends to sup-
port this interpretation. See S. KRASNER, supra note 231, at 3-6, 12-13, 29-31, 232, 235-41.
274. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 597-603; see also Russett & Sullivan, supra
note 208, at 54-55; R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 38, 76-77. Only some
150 states exist in total, many of which are relatively inactive; this number is many times
smaller than the voluntary organizations studied by Olson. Negotiations among the developed
countries involve only some two dozen states. Since the European Community ("EC") often
negotiates as a unit, following internal negotiations among a group of twelve, many important
negotiations center upon only the United States, the EC and Japan. See id. at 77.
275. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 594. This perspective is an aspect of strate-
gic rationality. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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may be crucial. Even, when there are many beneficiaries, cooperation
among a smaller number-usually designated "k"-can often produce
enough of the good to profit the participants, and each state of substan-
tial size may be crucial to formation of a k-group. In either case, so long
as states perceive that their participation is essential to the production of
the CG, they will have an incentive to cooperate based solely on the ben-
efits they stand to receive.
276
Even with a small group of beneficiaries or a potential k-group, coop-
eration is rarely a sure thing. Some states may fail to realize the impor-
tance of their contributions, especially if they have previously relied on a
hegemon. Lipson suggests, for example, that Japan has been slow to rec-
ognize the importance of its full participation in the liberal trade re-
gime.277 A continuing incentive to free-ride may also operate if alternate
k-groups could provide some quantity of a CG.278 In these circum-
stances, as in iterated PD games, the reactions of other states become
relevant.
A policy of conditional cooperation can encourage contributions: a
state will be less likely to free-ride if others credibly convey that their
contributions are contingent on its cooperation, or that they are prepared
to exclude it from the CG regime.279 Structural factors such as the ongo-
ing nature of state interactions and strategies like the linkage of CG con-
tributions to other issues can increase the likelihood of cooperation.
280
International rules, regimes and institutions can help states understand
the benefits of a CG and the nature of an appropriate contribution, in-
crease iteration, and facilitate negotiations on the allocation of costs. Re-
gimes can also facilitate monitoring and lend legitimacy to a policy of
exclusion. 281
C. Externalities
Another significant form of market failure, afflicting economic and
political markets alike, is the presence of externalities, i.e., situations in
which the conduct of market actors affects, negatively or positively, the
276. See, e.g., T. SCHELLING, MItROMOTIVES, supra note 221. Although participants in a
k-group, like a hegemon, receive benefits greater than their contributions, free-riders may still
profit even more. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 597-603.
277. Lipson, Cooperation, supra note 101, at 8-9.
278. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 599, 605-06.
279. " See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 76-77; Lipson, Cooperation,
supra note 101, at 6, 8-10.
280. See Snidal, HS Theory, supra note 41, at 594-95; R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY,
supra note 16, at 76-77.
281. For a discussion of similar effects in the context of the PD, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 141, 148-49, 162-73.
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circumstances of others.282 The standard illustration of a negative exter-
nality is the pollution emitted by a factory.283 The firm that owns the
factory need not consider the costs borne by its neighbors when it decides
at what level to operate. It is therefore likely to engage in more of the
externality-producing activity than is socially optimal. Beautification of
the factory grounds, on the other hand, benefits the neighbors, creating a
positive externality. Since the owner captures only part of the total social
benefit, it is likely to invest in this activity at a less than optimal level.
284
"Spill-over" externalities like these are pervasive in international rela-
tions, as in domestic society.285 The well-known Trail Smelter case,
2 8 6
for example, involved the prototypical polluting factory in an interna-
tional context. Many other transboundary environmental problems, in-
cluding acid rain and nuclear fallout from weapons tests or incidents like
Chernobyl, reflect the same paradigm. Environmental spillovers can also
affect other states indirectly by damaging international commons. For
example, interference with or pollution of international waterways can
have serious negative effects on downstream states.
287
Economic actions ranging from the protection or subsidization of local
industries to the formation of customs unions can create negative exter-
nalities for trading partners, even if the actions are not taken with any
predatory intent.288 The GATT recognizes this phenomenon in numer-
ous provisions, most notably in the 1979 Subsidies Code, which obligates
signatories to seek to avoid adverse external effects in the use of domestic
subsidy programs, even while recognizing the use of such subsidies as
legitimate. 289 Conybeare argues, in another context, that the New Inter-
national Economic Order ("NIEO") proposals advanced by developing
countries can be interpreted as an effort to combat negative externalities
generated by the trade, investment and aid policies of developed states, a
282. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 256.
283. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase,
Social Cost].
284. See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 92, at 539-40.
285. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 256, 258-59.
286. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949).
287. See Conybeare, International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights, 34
INT'L ORG. 307, 313-15 (1980) (discussing property rights and liability rules in international
environmental disputes) [hereinafter Conybeare, Property Rights].
288. See Abbott, Trading Nation's Dilemma, supra note 32, at 525-27, 527 n. 118.
289. See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
(26th Supp.) at 56, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 (1980); see also GATT, supra note 155,
art. XXIII, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (1st Supp.) at 51 (1952), 61 Stat. at (pt.
5) A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266, permitting contracting parties to complain that their benefits
under the Agreement are being nullified or impaired by trade measures of another party,
whether or not those measures violate any GATT rule.
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rationale that would support NIEO policies on grounds of efficiency as
well as equity.
290
Nuclear weapons tests and the proliferation of nuclear weapons gener-
ate negative security externalities for many states, not only the intended
targets. These effects are felt, moreover, even when defensive considera-
tions motivate the actions. Thus, the proliferation of nuclear weapons
generates both security and environmental externalities.
291
Conybeare has identified a variety of other examples, suggesting the
potential range of externality analysis. 292 States that encourage the culti-
vation of opium and other drug crops, for instance, impose negative ex-
ternalities on user states; this problem is expected to worsen with the end
of the war in Afghanistan. 293 Countries that force the emigration of
large numbers of people, or of "undesirables," create similar externalities
for the states that receive them. One might add that a state's maltreat-
ment of its citizens-including the refusal to permit emigration - may
create negative externalities for states with similar ethnic or religious
populations or strong sympathies for individual liberties.
While "spillover" situations form the core of externality analysis, ex-
ternalities also underlie most other forms of market failure. Negative
externalities are involved, for example, when CG beneficiaries free-ride
and when users overutilize a commons. Positive externalities are created
when a single state or a few states provide a CG, and when some com-
mons users take conservation measures. 294 Externality theory is thus ap-
plicable to these more complex cases.
A community in which externalities exist will benefit to the extent that
its members take into account ("internalize") the external costs br bene-
fits they create, for they will then engage in the relevant activities at more
nearly optimal levels. 295 The classical approach to encouraging internal-
ization calls for extensive government action: taxing or regulating activi-
ties that produce negative externalities, and subsidizing or incorporating
290. See Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 321.
291. See id. at 320. Reisman observes that the U.S. decision in the late 1940s to test
atomic weapons in the South Pacific was made in order to externalize the environmental costs.
See Reisman, International Law-making, supra note 25, at 114.
292. Conybeare, Propery Rights, supra note 287, at 319 (drug traffic), 320-21 (inefficient
national airlines and refugees).
293. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
294. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 53, at 256-59; Conybeare, Public Goods,
Prisoners' Dilemmas', supra note 114, at 8; see also Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure:
Frameworkfor Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 108 (1979) (difference between
externalities and public goods one of degree). In the PD game, defection creates a negative
externality. See Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas', supra note 114, at 8.




into the public sector those that create positive externalities. 296 This ap-
proach, however, is not wholly satisfactory even in domestic society,
297
and states have rarely delegated to supranational organizations the au-
thority needed to implement it.
An approach to externalities more congenial to international politics is
associated with Ronald Coase.298 Coase observed, first, that externalities
are potentially reciprocal: while state A's pollution may harm state B, A
would also be harmed if B could force it to eliminate the polluting activ-
ity. Thus, to think only of restricting the "active" state is not appropri-
ate; a community should aim "to avoid the more serious harm" and thus
to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources. 299 States have a
common interest in attaining this result, though they will also have con-
flicting interests in the distribution of the associated costs and benefits. 3°°
Coase went on to demonstrate that under certain stringent conditions,
market transactions will lead to the internalization of externalities and an
efficient allocation of resources without government intervention.301 The
market will produce this outcome, moreover, whatever the structure of
entitlements.302 If A were entitled to pollute, for instance, B could bar-
296. See id.; W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 92, at 542-43; Coase, Social Cost,
supra note 238, at 1-2; Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 156-57
(1979); Wolf, supra note 294, at 108. Conybeare argues that most international organization
scholars are in this tradition. See Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 307-08.
297. The two principal problems are (1) the difficulty of setting taxes, subsidies and the
like at appropriate levels, because of the difficulty of estimating optimal levels of activity and
because of second best problems, see Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 41-42; Dahlman,
supra note 296, at 157; Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 309; and (2) the poten-
tially suboptimal behavior of government, or "nonmarket failure." See Wolf, supra note 294.
298. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 85-93. The literature on the
Coase Theorem is vast. For an excellent bibliography, see Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase
Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 73 n.3 (1982).
299. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 2; Dahlman, supra note 296, at 159.
300. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 88, 97.
301. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 2-8; Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note
287, at 309-10; Dahlman, supra note 296, at 157-58. "Efficient" is used in the Pareto sense:
resources cannot be reallocated so as to make one party better off without making another
party worse off. For a complete listing of the conditions necessary to this result, see Hoffman
& Spitzer, supra note 298, at 73.
302. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 2-8. Coase suggested that the same allocation
of resources would be achieved whatever the structure of entitlements. See id. at 6. This
"invariance thesis" is controversial. It may hold only for certain forms of entitlements and
only in the short run. See generally Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72
CORN. L. REv. 245, 273-75 (1987). What seems clear, however, is that different allocations of
entitlements in some instances can affect the relative wealth of the parties, and thus the bar-
gains they can make. Such "wealth effects" undermine the invariance thesis. See B. ACKER-
MAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, at 23 (1975).
Conybeare argues that wealth effects are insignificant in international politics. See
Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 322-23. This issue may be worthy of further
study: to a small state, for example, the right to coastal fisheries, see id. at 319, might well be
significant.
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gain for a reduction in pollution to an efficient level, offering economic
assistance, trade concessions, or other compensation. If B were entitled
to be free from pollution, A could purchase the right to pollute up to
efficient levels. If all the conditions of the Coase Theorem are met, bar-
gains like these will be struck in every externality situation, resolving the
parties' conflicts over distribution and maximizing their joint welfare.
30 3
This analysis has powerful implications for a decentralized political
system.
In actuality, the ideal conditions of the Theorem are rarely, if ever,
met.30 4 Under those circumstances, the Coasean approach calls for a
community to consider whether reliance on private transactions or vari-
ous forms of public intervention will achieve a more efficient outcome.
The first step, however, is to investigate whether private transactions can
be facilitated: in Dahlman's words, to "find out if there is a feasible way
to decrease the costs of transacting between market agents .... ." The
costs of locating negotiating partners, identifying possible bases of ex-
change, bargaining, and monitoring any agreements reached are the
"heart of the problem." Any measures that reduce these costs will pro-
mote private transactions and improve the community's welfare. 30 5 As
discussed in the following section, many international regimes and insti-
tutions function to reduce transactions costs.
If these efforts are insufficient, Dahlman observes, the next response
should be to "[employ] taxes, legislative action, standards, prohibitions,
agencies, or whatever else can be thought of that will achieve the alloca-
tion of resources we have already decided is preferred. 3 06 The Coasean
approach, however, suggests forms of public intervention more suitable
to international politics than taxation or direct public administration.
The reassignment of property rights and other entitlements, in particular,
can often be effective. 30
7
As Calabresi has shown, the most efficient result will be obtained if
entitlements are assigned so that the costs of an activity that produces
negative externalities are borne by the party that can most cheaply avoid
its adverse external effects. When this test is inconclusive, entitlements
303. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 298, at 73-77; Calabresi, Transactions Costs, Re-
source Allocation, and Liability Rules- A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1968). Since the
conditions of the Theorem are essentially that bargains can be made costlessly and without
legal impediment or problems of negotiating strategy, the result is not as surprising as it first
seems. See id.; Dahlman, supra note 296, at 158.
304. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 15; B. ACKERMAN, supra note 302, at 23.
305. Dahlman, supra note 296, at 158, 160.
306. Id. at 160; Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 17-18.





should be structured so that the costs of the activity are borne by the
party with the lowest transactions costs, so that it can bargain with
others to relocate an entitlement assigned in error.30 8 Rational states
should demand that the international legal order reflect such efficient en-
titlement structures.
Calabresi and Melamed have gone on to analyze when property rules
(which entitle parties to act, or to prevent certain actions, unless they
agree otherwise) are sufficient to achieve efficient outcomes, and when
liability rules (which entitle parties to act, or to be free of certain actions,
unless paid an objectively determined amount) may be necessary, even
though the latter require greater government involvement. This decision,
too, turns on elements of market failure: transactions costs, opportuni-
ties for free-riding, accidental encounters, and the like.
30 9
, It is not necessary (or possible) to review here all the implications of
these lines of analysis, which have revolutionized torts, property and
other areas of legal scholarship. The essential point is that the market
analogy makes it possible to apply them to the study of international
politics and law. In one extensive application, Conybeare argues that
states have created many rules that assign entitlements so as to promote
efficient resource allocation. 310 He points in particular to international
tort and environmental law. "There exist today legal mechanisms for
dealing with marine, freshwater, air, space, and radioactivity externali-
ties.''31' He also argues that the extension of national jurisdiction in the
oceans should efficiently internalize externalities.
312
Apart from his valuable positive analysis, Conybeare takes a strong
normative position, arguing from the examples he cites that states can
deal with externalities and other market failures through the assignment
308. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
SiS 135-52 (1970). For a summary of the argument, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-
98 (1972). This analysis relates only to economic efficiency; distributional preferences might
change the choice of entitlements. See id. at 1098-1101.
309. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 308, at 1105-10. The authors also analyze rules
of inalienability. Id. at 1111-15; see also Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 312-
13.
310. See, e.g., Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287. Conybeare's position is similar
to the arguments of Judge Posner that the common law has developed so as to maximize
wealth, and that wealth maximization is an appropriate ethical criterion. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88-115 (1983). Conybeare, however, explicitly refrains from
claiming that all rules of international law are efficient. Conybeare, Property Rights, supra
note 287.
311. See Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 314. For a discussion of such
rules, see Kiss, supra note 238, at 1071-75.
312. See Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 319. For a similar argument in
the context of commons theory, see supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
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of entitlements and private transactions well enough that extensive su-
pranational institutions are usually unnecessary. 313 This argument is
more controversial, since most observers find international environmen-
tal law considerably less satisfactory than Conybeare paints it. Kiss, for
example, observes that the ambiguities in environmental liability rules
"make it doubtful whether in concrete cases redress for damage caused
by . . .pollution can be ensured with a probability which allows...
preventive effects."' 314 Difficulties in dispute resolution and enforcement
raise similar doubts. At the same time, it should be noted that some
environmental treaties do in fact rely on modest supranational institu-
tions.315 Closer study of important issue areas should lead to a more
nuanced assessment.
In addition to the insights that international rules, regimes and institu-
tions can be interpreted as devices to reduce transactions costs and to
allocate entitlements in efficient ways, a third implication of Coase's ap-
proach should be mentioned. Many international interactions and agree-
ments-involving both simple spillovers and more complex market
failures-can be analyzed in terms of the presence or absence of the pri-
vate welfare-increasing bargains the theory predicts. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, for example, was explicitly based on such a bargain:
non-nuclear-weapons states would renounce nuclear weapons, avoiding
negative externalities, in return for materials and technology for the de-
velopment of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.316 With the advent of reac-
tors that produce plutonium as a byproduct of peaceful use, however,
this policy became internally contradictory, and negotiations to restruc-
ture the original bargain soon began. 31
7
In other cases-as in similar domestic situations involving individu-
als3 18-a seemingly feasible and appropriate bargain was not made. For
313. See Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 307-08. Conybeare does acknowl-
edge that institutions can assist states in agreeing on property and liability rules and in adjudi-
cating disputes. Id. at 315-16, 332-33.
314. Kiss, supra note 238, at 1079; see also Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary Air
Pollution: The Search for an International Response, 8 HAR. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 120-23
(1984).
315. See von Moltke, International Commissions and Implementation of International En-
vironmentalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 87 (J. Carroll ed. 1988);
Birnie, The Role of International Law in Solving Certain Environmental Conflicts, in id. at 95,
106-09.
316. See NPT, supra note 124, arts. I, II, IV, V, 21 U.S.T. at 487-90, 729 U.N.T.S. 171-73.
A similar bargain was at the heart of previous non-proliferation proposals, notably Atoms for
Peace. See NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, supra note 169, at 233-34.
317. See Conybeare, Property Rights, supra note 287, at 320.
318. For a discussion of an experiment in which Coasean predictions did not occur in spite
of apparently favorable conditions, see Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Bonus Schemes




example, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974-=
which linked economic cooperation with the Soviet Union to an easing of
restrictions on Jewish emigration 319-can be seen as a proposed Coasean
bargain designed to reduce the negative externalities created by Soviet
policies. Soviet rejection of the offer demonstrates a significant problem
with the market approach: even if transactions costs are low, states may
simply be unable to agree on a distribution of costs and benefits. Agree-
ment is particularly difficult when negotiations involve a bilateral mo-
nopoly-two states that have no alternative to dealing with each other-
and when important state prerogatives are involved. Poorly chosen ne-
gotiating approaches and strategic behavior can intensify the problem.
320
Numerous situations are amenable to a similar analysis. Consider, for
example, the acid rain dispute between Canada and the United States.
The heart of the dispute is a standard spill-over externality: cross-border
pollution from American factories. Canada has often demanded action
by the United States, but no Coasean bargain has been reached. Modern
IR theory suggests several explanatory hypotheses: (1) transactions costs
may be excessive (this seems unlikely in the circumstances, however); (2)
the relevant property or liability rules may be unclear and not easily de-
termined, or improperly assigned; (3) bilateral monopoly problems may
be impeding settlement: even if both parties have identified a range of
acceptable bargains, haggling over the precise terms of the bargain may
be preventing any agreement (while wasting social resources); (4) the
parties' negotiating strategies may be obstructing agreement (for exam-
ple, either or both parties may resist the notion of any Coasean bargain
as somehow inappropriate for a sovereign nation); (5) the present situa-
tion may be efficient. Beyond merely illuminating significant interna-
tional controversies, this mode of analysis could ultimately suggest
approaches to their resolution.
D. Summary
The analogy between international politics and the workings of the
market offers another valuable approach for scholars interested in under-
standing the interactions of rational states, especially when many states
are involved. The study of "market failure," situations in which unregu-
lated market-like interactions fail to achieve efficient and harmonious re-
sults, is particularly relevant to IL scholars. This section has presented
319. For a discussion of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, see A. LOWENFELD, TRADE
CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 166-90 (2d ed. 1983). For a more general discussion of the
strategy of issue linkage, see Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 40, at 239-41.
320. See Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-24 (1982).
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two important forms of political market failure, collective goods (includ-
ing commons) and externalities. Modem IR theory views many interna-
tional rules, regimes and institutions as devices to overcome such market
failures.
As in mixed-motive games, individual states in market failure settings
may face incentives to free-ride as well as to cooperate. Here again, mod-
em IR theory has begun to explore the factors and strategies that favor
international cooperation. In CG situations, these include the presence
of a dominant actor, exclusion, and conditional cooperation. In external-
ity settings, they include the reduction of impediments to negotiation and
the reallocation of entitlements, both devices designed to encourage de-
centralized Coasean bargains. Coasean analysis links modem IR theory
with the scholarly tradition of law and economics.
V. Primary Market Failures
Structural impediments to decentralized, welfare-increasing transac-
tions are at the heart of externality problems and other market failures. I
call these impediments "primary" market failures. Coase's approach to
externalities focuses attention on the ways in which a community can act
to correct primary market failures, making possible, in Dahlman's
words, an economic theory of institutions.3 21 Keohane has begun to de-
velop such a theory for the institutions of international politics.3 22 His
analysis concentrates on two important impediments to Coasean bargain-
ing: high transactions costs 323 and imperfect information. Before turn-
ing to these, I will consider a third impediment to which Keohane only
briefly alludes-ill-defined property rights.
A. Property Rights
Property rights and other entitlements that are poorly defined and
costly to determine can be an impediment to bargaining in any market
setting. A party's entire approach to a negotiation--e.g., whether to pro-
ceed by offering compensation or to await offers of compensation-turns
on its understanding of how relevant entitlements are assigned. If the
location of entitlements is unclear, it will be difficult, though not impossi-
321. See Dahlman, supra note 296, at 161-62. Keohane calls a focus on the impediments
to Coasean bargaining an "inversion" of the Coase Theorem. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HE-
GEMONY, supra note 16, at 87.
322. See R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 85-109. See generally Keo-
hane, Demand, supra note 27.
323. With zero transactions costs and multiple actors, shifting coalitions could make bar-
gaining difficult and agreements unstable. For multi-party situations, the ideal may be low yet
positive transactions costs. See R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 87.
Vol. 14:335, 1989
International Relations Theory
ble, for bargaining to proceed at all. If the relevant entitlements depend
on imprecise concepts like a "reasonable amount," agreement between
states will be all the more difficult.324 Similar problems in the domestic
context lead to the litigation of disputes that might otherwise be
settled.32
5
The value of clarifying entitlements suggests interesting subjects for
further study. For one thing, the "default" property rights implicit in
anarchy leave the costs (or benefits) of externalities where they fall.
326
Whatever the other flaws of this system, its assignment of entitlements is
at least clear. Efforts by states, international organizations and publicists
to reassign particular entitlements in the interest of equity or efficiency
may ultimately lead to laudable results, but may in the interim cieate
such uncertainty that welfare-increasing bargains are difficult to achieve.
This uncertainty may be a significant cost of General Assembly resolu-
tions and other forms of "soft law." The doctrine that violations of cus-
tomary law contain the seeds of new rules, similarly, seems almost
custom-made to maximize the difficulty of Coasean bargaining. On the
other hand, a desire to clarify entitlements might help account for the
increasing popularity of treaties, particularly codification treaties, which
directly replace customary law.
327
When the assignment of entitlements is unclear, or the entitlements
themselves are imprecise, it is important to ask whether authoritative in-
terpretation by courts or other institutions is readily available. If the cost
of determining the application of a rule to a particular situation is negli-
gible, unclear entitlements will not impede bargaining; if interpretation is
costly, however, they will: "even in a situation where transactions costs
are low relative to the gains from trade, high entitlement-determination
costs may independently frustrate the achievement of an ideal allocation
of resources. '32
8
324. Stepping outside the Coasean approach, Carol Rose has recently argued that clear
entitlements may have unexpected costs and imprecise entitlements unexpected benefits; im-
precise rules may function best in long-term relationships. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). Although beyond the scope of this article, Rose's ap-
proach is highly suggestive for the study of international law.
325. See Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Cost of Determining Property Rights, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 13, 20-21, 23-25 (1985); Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 298, at 73; R. KEO-
HANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 87-89.
326. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 86; Conybeare, Property
Rights, supra note 287, at 314 (discussing pre-20th century rules of international environmen-
tal law).
327. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 64, intro, note to pt. I, ch. 1, at 20 ("A
law that not long ago was almost wholly customary is now overlaid by an elaborate network of
treaties.").
328. Merrill, supra note 325, at 25.
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Unfortunately, the means available to states for clarifying entitlements
are far from costless. State practice, at best, requires time to develop.
Arbitration and rulings of the International Court of Justice are rarely
available without the consent of both parties, and are costly in terms of
time and money because of their ad hoc character. Other international
dispute settlement procedures-good offices, mediation, fact-finding,
conciliation, and recommendations-may further negotiations in other
ways, but do not necessarily clarify legal rights. 329 Procedures based on
negotiation, moreover, contribute only marginally to clarifying entitle-
ments for the future. The same is true of arbitration when awards are
kept private and cannot serve as precedents. Even the statute of the ICJ
denies formal precedential value to decisions of the Court. 330 IL scholars
might well assess dispute settlement arrangements in international agree-
ments and regimes in terms of their contribution to the collective good of
entitlement determination.
B. Transactions Costs
The term "transactions costs" includes the expenditures of time,
money and other resources necessary, in Coase's words, "to discover who
it is that one wishes to deal with . . . and on what terms, to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to under-
take the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are
being observed, and so on."' 331 These categories of costs correspond
neatly to the phases of a transaction: the costs of search (for negotiating
partners and bases of exchange), bargaining, monitoring and
enforcement.
Keohane's theory of international institutions incorporates the concept
of transactions costs. His theory distinguishes individual agreements
among states, such as a tariff reduction agreement, from regimes and
other complex normative orders, such as the GATT: regimes are sub-
stantively more comprehensive, include procedural provisions, and are
329. For a brief description of these procedures, see Sohn, The Future of Dispute Settle-
ment, in STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 1121-31.
330. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 155, art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1062.
331. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 238, at 15; see Merrill, supra note 325, at 21-22. Keo-
hane's implicit definition of transactions costs is confusingly broad. To Keohane, a particular
agreement, such as a discriminatory trade arrangement, will be made more costly to the parties
if it violates the norms of a regime like the GATT: the agreement will carry the stigma of a
violation and may be met with authorized retaliation. Thus, a regime can increase the costs of
transactions inconsistent with its norms relative to the costs of consistent transactions, See R.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 89-90. This notion of the costliness of trans-




often institutionalized. 332 Many international agreements are not made
in isolation, but are "nested" within regimes; the tariff agreement under
the GATT is the prototypical example. Regimes, Keohane theorizes,
function to facilitate such subsidiary agreements, in part by reducing
transactions costs. States will seek to create regimes when they can cost-
effectively contribute to the conclusion of desirable agreements. 333
Regimes can reduce the costs of every phase of a transaction. 334 In the
search phase, regimes can help states locate suitable negotiating partners
by bringing together those states interested in an issue and willing to
negotiate about it. They can also reduce the costs of identifying potential
bargains by producing, and requiring states to produce, relevant informa-
tion.335 As Frederic Kirgis, Jr. has suggested, consultation requirements
can perform a similar function, facilitating contact and identification of
issues between parties to externalities. 336 Regimes can also reduce the
costs of bargaining, particularly when they provide "forums for meetings
and secretariats that. can act as catalysts for agreement. ' 337 An even
more pragmatic benefit is that regimes in which bargains have previously
been struck will be able to provide "forms" for agreements on the same
or related issues. Partial regimes and individual agreements can also per-
form this function: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, for
example, is not a regime in Keohane's sense-an umbrella for individual
arms control agreements-but its provisions on verification and other
matters are still expected to reduce the transactions costs of future nego-
tiations. As these examples suggest, the notion of reducing transactions
costs offers a fruitful approach to the analysis of a wide range of interna-
tional arrangements. •
Regimes will not always be cost-effective. When parties can identify
and contact each other readily and have only isolated issues to resolve,
ad hoc negotiations may suffice. Keohane suggests, however, that re-
332. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 149-50, 153-54. In fact, no
sharp boundary separates individual agreements from more complex orders. An example of an
arrangement on the borderline-more complex than a tariff bargain but less so than a regime
like GATT-is the recent INF Treaty. See supra note 168. The treaty is a bilateral agreement
calling for the destruction of missiles, launchers and bases, but it includes complex provisions
for verification and creates a specialized institution, the Special Verification Commission, for
dispute settlement. This agreement could be considered a partial regime for a narrow set of
issues. Cf. Nye, Nuclear Learning, supra note 72, at 391-98.
333. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 149-50, 153-55.
334. The role of regimes in monitoring and enforcement has already been discussed. See
supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
335. See Dahlman, supra note 296, at 147; infra text accompanying notes 346-47.
336. F. KIRGIS, JR., PRIOR CONSULTATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF
STATE PRACTICE 1-3 (1983).
337. R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 90.
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gimes will be valuable in "dense policy spaces," situations in which states
must deal with many significant interrelated issues.338 Ad hoc negotia-
tions on each such issue would be complicated by the need to consider
possible overlaps and conflicts. A regime reduces these complications by
providing guidelines for consistency through its principles and norms.
The clustering of numerous reJated issues under a single regime also fa-
cilitates side payments: "more potential quids are available for the quo."
Since national bureaucracies are often organized along the lines of the
international regimes with which they deal, it may be easier to gain do-
mestic approval of side payments negotiated in a single forum. When
regimes themselves are nested or linked, "crossover" payments are facili-
tated in similar ways.
339
Regimes may actually produce effects akin to economies of scale: as
more issues are negotiated together, each can be dealt with more cheaply,
at least up to a point.34° Increasing returns in negotiation should tend to
produce more extensive regimes, just as increasing returns in production
tend to produce larger firms.341 A similar analysis may explain why re-
gimes themselves are often linked: grafting a new regime onto a func-
tioning one costs less than creating an independent regime from
scratch.34
2
An excellent example of these effects is the postwar trade regime. The
GATT was initially concerned primarily with tariffs on trade in goods.
By the time of the Tokyo Round in the mid-1970s, states had begun to
utilize the GATT framework to negotiate complex rules on non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods, including internal matters such as government
procurement policies that were barely addressed in the original agree-
ment. During the Uruguay Round, the GATT negotiations have ex-
panded to include barriers to trade in services and the trade-related
aspects of rules on investment and intellectual property. All three sub-
jects could logically be the subjects of separate regimes-indeed intellec-
tual property is already the subject of several regimes, most administered
by the World Intellectual Property Organization-but they are instead
being dealt with under the umbrella of the GATT. The services negotia-
tions have been kept formally separate, to placate states opposed to any
new rules on services, but they have been linked procedurally to capture
economies of scale.
343
338. See id. at 79; Keohane, Demand, supra note 27, at 339-41.
339. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 79-80, 91-92.
340. See id. at 90.
341. See id.; W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 92, at 395-96, 413-16.
342. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 90-91.





Most transactions costs are products of inadequate information. Defi-
ciencies in information obviously account for search costs; in addition,
bargaining is only necessary because none of the parties knows in ad-
vance the terms on which the others are prepared to deal, and the costs
of monitoring and enforcement need only be incurred because none of
the parties knows if the others will fulfill their bargains. 344 The search
for information, including second-order information on ways to acquire
and verify more basic information, is always costly. 345 Imperfect infor-
mation, then, emerges as perhaps the greatest impediment to welfare-
increasing transactions.
Keohane views international regimes as efficiently, creating and dis-
seminating many kinds of relevant information, some of which have al-
ready been noted. 346 In the search phase of a transaction, regimes reveal
the identity of states interested in an issue, willing to negotiate on it, and
committed to an acceptable range of outcomes. By the same token, re-
gime membership acts as a form of "signalling," a shorthand communi-
cation of a state's interests and attitudes. 347 The signalling function may
constitute a significant incentive for membership in international
regimes.
At the negotiating stage, regimes can modify states' understanding of
an issue area and help them see possibilities for exchange. They can pro-
vide facts about the circumstances of the parties and the likely results of
particular bargains. They can clarify entitlements and set normative
boundaries for permissible agreement, thereby simplifying negotiations.
Regimes under which previous negotiations have taken place can provide
information about likely problems and potential solutions.
348
Regimes in mixed-motive settings often include extensive provisions
for monitoring compliance with regime norms and subsidiary agree-
ments, ranging from transparency requirements to supranational surveil-
lance. At the enforcement stage, regimes can clarify what activities
constitute violations, provide procedures for determining when a viola-
tion has occurred, and convey to states the likely consequences of viola-
344. Dahlman, supra note 296, at 148.
345. E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 119-20.
346. In addition to their formal functions, Keohane suggests that regimes catalyze infor-
mal exchanges of information through the personal contact of national officials. R. KEOHANE,
AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 97; Keohane, Demand, supra note 27, at 349.
347. See E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 176-77.
348. According to Mackaay, law can often be seen as assisting negotiations by alerting the
parties to the contingencies that may befall them. E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 65.
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tion.349 More generally, the existence of norms and rules constraining
state behavior reduces the uncertainty of international transactions to a
significant, if less than optimal, degree.
350
From the perspective of a state contemplating an international agree-
ment, the most important information may be the likelihood that its ne-
gotiating partners will keep their commitments. The only sources of this
information are the other states themselves. In the coordination and
Stag Hunt games and other cooperative settings, states have incentives to
reveal their intentions truthfully and credibly. In mixed-motive settings,
however, states-like sellers of goods and services in an economic mar-
ket351-will often have incentives to mislead. 352 Where information
comes predominantly from "seller" states, then, "buyer" states will, at
the very least, be forced to expend extra resources on verification or
backup sources, making transactions more costly.353 Where buyer states
fear deception and double-crossing, and cannot obtain sufficient informa-
tion to allay their fears, they may simply refuse to enter into agreements.
Some welfare-increasing bargains thus will not be made.
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Keohane's analysis focuses on this problem of asymmetrical informa-
tion.355 His model is the "market for lemons" described by George
Akerlof: owners of defective used cars ("lemons") have a greater incen-
tive to sell them than owners of quality cars; most used-car buyers can-
not easily distinguish between a quality car and a lemon, and so will
often refuse to pay the true market value of a quality car; owners of qual-
ity cars will thus be reluctant to sell them at the going price; and some
mutually beneficial sales of quality cars will not take place.
356
Participants in the used car market address this problem by doing
business through reputable dealers. States utilize much the same device:
as an inexpensive proxy for hard to acquire information on whether ne-
gotiating partners are likely to honor their commitments, states look to
the reputation they have acquired by their performance under past agree-
ments. Regimes, Keohane suggests, help buyer states assess the reputa-
349. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
350. R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 89.
351. See E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 159-61.
352. R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 92-93; Keohane, Demand, supra
note 27, at 343-44, 346-47. An important example is the disguising of preferences for the
production of CGs. See D. MUELLER, supra note 65, at 68-89.
353. E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 161-63.
354. R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 93.
355. Regimes that disseminate information will reduce relative asymmetries by increasing
the absolute level of information. See id. at 94.
356. See Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty'and the Market Mecha-




tions of sellers in the market for international agreements, and help
reputable sellers convey their good reputations, enabling advantageous
negotiations to go forward. Regimes facilitate the communication and
assessment of reputations by "providing standards of behavior against
which performance can be measured, by linking these standards to spe-
cific issues, and by providing forums, often through international organi-
zations, in which these evaluations can be made."
357
At least the first two of these functions can be performed by individual
agreements and customary rules as well as by regimes. Performance or
breach of almost any obligation, whether customary or conventional, ad
hoc or intrinsic to a regime, may be "capitalized" into reputation and
considered by others in future negotiations, even in different issue areas.
For rational states with an interest in entering welfare-increasing bar-
gains, the importance of reputation creates a significant incentive for
compliance with international norms.
358
Keohane also analyzes information asymmetry in terms of two other
models-moral hazard and adverse selection-drawn from the insurance
industry.35 9 Moral hazard arises when an insured can affect the accuracy
of an insurer's estimate of risk, either by failing to disclose risk factors
before a policy is issued or by engaging in increasingly risky behavior
after its issue. If moral hazard is unchecked, insurance may become un-
available. Similarly, a state entering negotiations in a mixed-motive situ-
ation will have the insured's incentive to conceal any intention it may
have to cheat or free-ride once agreement is reached. Consummation of
an agreement may actually strengthen its incentive to defect by increas-
ing the likelihood that others will keep their commitments. Concern
over these problems can inhibit welfare-increasing bargains.
Insurers, and states, address moral hazard in several ways. Insurers
typically force insureds to bear a significant part of the risk through de-
ductibles and the like.360 For states, the use of "hostages," retaliatory
sanctions, and reciprocal suspension of obligations may play equivalent
roles. 361 Once policies are issued, insurers may try to monitor the con-
duct of their insureds, although that is often too costly. For states, inter-
national regimes can make monitoring more feasible. Finally, insurers
357. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 94.
358. See id. at 105-06.
359. See id. at 95-96. For a discussion of these phenomena, see E. MACKAAY, supra note
83, at 191-95.
360. See E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 191-95.
361. See supra notes 144-59 and accompanying text; cf Conybeare, Public Goods, Prison-
ers' Dilemmas, supra note 114, at 14.
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rely heavily on driving records and other evidence of past behavior;362
states look to reputation.
Regimes also address the problem of adverse selection. Adverse selec-
tion occurs when high-risk parties seek to enter an insurance pool in dis-
proportionate numbers. If insurers are unable to distinguish sufficiently
among applicants with respect to the levels of risk they pose, they may be
forced to set insurance premiums at very high levels, driving out low-risk
applicants. States entering negotiations, like applicants for insurance and
credit, present different degrees of risk. Those that have little to offer
may be more enthusiastic about entering agreements than those that have
much; those with little compunction about abandoning commitments
may be more willing to enter agreements than those that intend to adhere
to them faithfully. By providing information about behavior under past
commitments, regimes can help states differentiate among negotiating
partners the way insurers and lenders seek to differentiate among appli-
cants. States that are the equivalent of teenage drivers should find it
more difficult to enter into beneficial agreements.
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D. Summary
Structural impediments to negotiation, like ill-defined property rights,
high transactions costs and imperfect information, lie at the core of polit-
ical market failures. Modern IR theory views many international rules,
regimes and institutions as devices to ameliorate these impediments,
making higher levels of cooperation possible. International rules func-
tion to clarify and efficiently allocate entitlements. International regimes
and institutions can reduce the costs of search and bargaining and aid in
monitoring and enforcement. They can also create and disseminate
many kinds of relevant information, especially as to the likelihood that
negotiating partners will fulfill potential commitments. Reliance on rep-
utation as a source of information on future compliance constitutes a
major incentive for compliance with existing norms and obligations.
VI. Conclusion
International politics is an inherently difficult subject for any theory to
explain. The major actors are complex institutions, with preferences and
motives that are difficult to ascertain. Multiple causes contribute to most
events. The small number of cases typically available for empirical inves-
362. E. MACKAAY, supra note 83, at 194.
363. See R. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 96-97; E. MACKAAY, supra
note 83, at 188.
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tigation provide "a poor substitute for a laboratory. ' '364 One must add,
in candor, that modem IR theory has significant weaknesses of its own.
As a rational'choice theory, it relies on simplifying assumptions, and re-
quires the analyst to specify state preferences without a clear understand-
ing of how such preferences are formed or change. As a structural
theory, it cannot reliably predict or explain in detail the conduct of par-
ticular states.
This article has attempted to demonstrate, however, that in spite of
such unavoidable difficulties, modem IR theory presents IL scholars
with stimulating opportunities for the study of international rules, re-
gimes and institutions. In this Conclusion, I will summarize the major
lines of inquiry and analysis that the theory makes possible. I will illus-
trate these areas of inquiry with some tentative observations on the ex-
ample set out in the Introduction: the norms and institutions of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty ("LTBT") and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty ("NPT").
365
A. Defense of International Norms
Modern IR theory presents IL scholars with an analytically rigorous
response to the pervasive skepticism with which observers, from law stu-
dents to government officials, often view international cooperation in
general and international law and institutions in particular. In the long
run, the rehabilitation of international norms and institutions could be
the most important effect of the integration of this body of theory with
IL scholarship. Using modem IR theory, one can explain deduc-
tively 366-without any reference to idealism or altruism 367-why rational
self-interested states might find it in their interest to create norms and
institutions like those of the LTBT and NPT and to comply with their
dictates, even in an issue area rife with discord and competition. 368 The
theory helps justify our confidence in the reality and value of interna-
tional law, and can help convey that confidence to hard-headed skeptics.
IL scholars may well object that a theory so apparently remote from
mainstream IL writings-as illustrated in the Introduction by a compari-
364. Nye, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 40 WORLD POL. 235, 235 (1988).
365. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
366. The most influential justification of the reality and force of international law to date,
L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 6, is essentially inductive, reasoning back-
ward from the ways in which governments seem to take account of international law.
367. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 16, at 107.
368. Even the United States and the Soviet Union have apparently modified their conduct
to accord with these conventions. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL, supra note 25,
at 133 (LTBT); Nye, Nuclear Learning, supra note 72, at 396-97 (NPT).
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son with the major American casebooks 369-is a poor vehicle for the de-
fense of international law. Surprisingly, however, a careful look at the
casebooks suggests that modern IR theory is intellectually less alien than
might first appear.
For one thing, these works typically adopt a third image perspec-
tive,370 depicting international law as a device by which states, consid-
ered generically, pursue their interests within a given political context.
371
For the most part, the casebooks adopt the assumption that states are the
principal international actors. 372 More surprisingly, they typically,
though often implicitly, characterize states according to the assumptions
of rational actor theory. The casebooks almost always treat states as uni-
tary entities, 373 and portray them as egoistic374 and strategically
rational.
375
The major divergence from modern IR theory lies in the casebooks'
treatment of anarchy. The casebooks usually present the absence of cen-
tral institutions in the context of criticism of the international legal sys-
tem,376 rather than as one parameter of an explanatory model, and
respond to the criticism defensively. 377 This reaction effectively prevents
the kinds of demand and supply analysis described in this article. If IL
scholars are willing to embrace the analytic approach of modern IR the-
ory, however, they should be able to do so with a minimum of intellec-
tual adjustment.
B. Functional Analysis of International Norms
Modern IR theory can help IL scholars better understand the func-
tions that rules, regimes and institutions perform for states. This func-
369. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 28-38.
371. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at xxix (law made by
states to govern their relations), 20-21 (international law is instrument of policy), 32 (interna-
tional law reflects emergence of common interests among states). This text is referred to in this
section, as well as in !he Introduction, as representative of the standard IL casebooks.
372. See id. at 10, 35, 228-29 (states are "principal addressees of international law," its
primary subjects and its principal creators). The casebooks also note the growing importance
of non-state actors. See id. at 32-33.
373. See id. at 228 (states are legal persons), 229 ("a state is an entity.... ."). But see id. at
4-5 (states are not persons and have no will) (quoting J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th
ed. 1963)).
374. See id. at 8 ("[n]ations recognize that the observance of law is in their interest"), 26-
27 (legal obligations further national interests), 33-34 (self-preservation is supreme interest of
states), 36 (states act for reasons of power and interest).
375. See id. at 8 ("rational calculation of cost and advantage"), 18 ("[r]ational apprecia-
tion of the advantages of a relationship" restrains temptation to violate norms), 21 (states
consider responses of victims and consequences for friendly relations with other states).
376. See id. at 1, 8-10, 17-18.




tional approach can immediately add depth and richness to the formal
analysis of normative arrangements which is often the subject of current
IL scholarship. The approach could even contribute to positive legal
analysis, particularly where the purpose of a norm is a relevant
consideration. 3
78
Functional analysis suggests that the LTBT and NPT help resolve ba-
sic PD situations afflicting the United States and the U.S.S.R. The
LTBT brought under control a form of arms race that might have en-
tailed great cost and grave environmental risks without a gain in security
for either side. At the same time, it responded to increasing pressure
from states suffering negative externalities from atmospheric testing.
This pressure has effectively reversed the prevailing entitlements, leading,
it appears, to a more efficient allocation. The NPT counteracted PD in-
centives that might have led the United States and the U.S.S.R. to com-
pete in providing nuclear weapons and technology to potential client
states or commercial customers.
The NPT also served to prevent or control nuclear arms race PDs
among other rival states, although the force of the security dilemma in
some regions has prevented universal adherence. Both conventions also
sought to prevent the security and environmental externalities that would
be created if additional states sought to develop nuclear weapons capa-
bilities without restraint. Compared with unregulated atmospheric test-
ing and the spread of nuclear arms, both regimes can be considered CGs.
Game theory suggests that, even in PD situations, states resist interna-
tional cooperation as much out of fear of exploitation as out of a tempta-
tion to exploit. The United States was willing to halt nuclear testing, for
example, but feared that the U.S.S.R. would be able to cheat. The LTBT
served as an assurance of commitment, making agreement by both sides
easier. It also provided bright line standards, tied to the ability of each
side to monitor the other's behavior, for the assessment of subsequent
conduct. The NPT dealt with similar concerns. Although peaceful uses
of atomic energy complicated monitoring, and many participating states
had limited monitoring capabilities, the unusual safeguard responsibili-
ties of the International Atomic Energy Agency have functioned to fill
this gap.
378. See Law of Treaties, supra note 155, art. 31, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (treaties to
be interpreted, inter alia, in light of "object and purpose.").
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C. Supply of International Norms
Modern IR theory can help IL scholars better understand the creation,
or "supply," of international rules, regimes and institutions. Three sepa-
rate lines of inquiry can be distinguished: (1) study of the structural con-
ditions that favor or hinder international cooperation-under hegemonic
stability theory, the distribution of power; under cooperation theory,
such factors as the number of states involved in an interaction, the itera-
tion of the interaction, and other determinants of the "shadow of the
future"; (2) study of the techniques by which states seek to achieve coop-
eration and compliance under existing conditions-devices such as
Coasean bargaining, exclusion, and policies of conditional cooperation or
tit-for-tat; (3) study of the strategies through which states can modify
prevailing conditions and improve the possibilities for cooperation-
changing potential payoffs, increasing iteration, increasing the quality
and availability of information, linking regimes, and the like. These
forms of supply-side analysis constitute a greater innovation for IL schol-
ars than the functional analysis of existing regimes, and they offer the
exciting normative possibility of contributing to the development of in-
ternational law.
Looking first at the structural conditions influencing international co-
operation, the LTBT, while ultimately adhered to by more than one hun-
dred states, was initially negotiated among a very small number,
primarily between the United States and the U.S.S.R. As the negotia-
tions were politically sensitive and technically complex, the small
number of states involved appears to have been an important factor in
their success. A larger number of states participated in the drafting of
the NPT, but institutions such as NATO and the 18-Nation Disarma-
ment Conference made their participation manageable. In both cases,
the General Assembly functioned as a forum in which less-powerful
states could voice their positions and exert bargaining pressure.
Another structural attribute, the shadow of the future, was a major
factor in producing cooperation and compliance with these regimes, es-
pecially between the United States and the U.S.S.R. In negotiating the
LTBT, for example, each state could count on the existence of the other,
for the indefinite future, as a rival committed to and capable of develop-
ing new weapons. Once the convention was signed, violations were al-
most certain to be observed, and each could expect that the other would
quickly resume testing in response. In fact, the United States acted con-
sciously to increase the certainty of its response, maintaining costly test-
ing preparations precisely to communicate its commitment to a tit-for-tat




control negotiations were announced simultaneously with the signing of
the treaty, linking issues in a way that gave each side a reputational stake
in compliance.
In consolidating their virtual nuclear duopoly through the NPT, both
superpowers advanced their common interest in quelling regional con-
flicts that could prompt their mutual intervention. Incentives to cooper-
ate and comply with the NPT were less strong for small states engaged in
regional rivalries: unlike the United States and the U.S.S.R., who al-
ready possessed enormous power, a significant nuclear advance by a
smaller state could significantly change the local military balance. Fear
of a disastrous sucker's payoff has thus made it impossible for some states
to join or comply fully with the regime.
Negotiation of the NPT is also noteworthy for the techniques by which
the participation of many small states was obtained. Some states, clients
of the United States and the U.S.S.R., were undoubtedly influenced by
the power of their patrons. Others may have joined for the purpose of
signalling their peaceful and cooperative attitudes. Still others, however,
were convinced to participate by the Coasean bargain explicit in the con-
vention: the nuclear powers would assist with peaceful uses of atomic
energy and commit themselves to restrain "vertical proliferation" in re-
turn for a commitment to forego nuclear arms.
The entire bargain, it is worth noting, was not included in the text of
the NPT: to assuage non-weapons states concerned that nuclear weap-
ons might be used against them, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the
U.K. issued parallel declarations pledging to act under the U.N. Charter
in aid of an NPT signatory threatened by nuclear arms. 379 Modern IR
theory directs attention to a variety of such non-legal arrangements that
perform the same functions as legal norms. IL scholars, in particular,
might fruitfully explore the reasons why states sometimes choose to gov-
ern their relations through legal arrangements, and sometimes through
informal ones.
The LTBT and the NPT can also be interpreted as efforts to modify
existing conditions, making further cooperation easier. The LTBT, in
particular, was explicitly seen as a first step toward broader U.S.-Soviet
cooperation and eventual d~tente.380 The treaty was advertised within
the United States, at least, as establishing patterns of negotiation, demon-
strating the existence of common interests, providing an opportunity to
demonstrate compliance, and showing the effectiveness of national tech-
379. See INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL, supra note 25, at 158.
380. See id. at 131-33.
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nical means of monitoring. Its carefully drafted withdrawal clause has
also been used essentially verbatim in subsequent major arms control
agreements. 381 The IAEA safeguards system may have contributed to
broader participation in the NPT by increasing confidence that the
sucker's payoff-i.e., the vulnerability of unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment--could be avoided. The NPT as a whole can be seen as increasing
confidence in the security of the political environment in many areas of
the world, making other forms of cooperation easier to accept.
D. Generation of New Hypotheses
Snidal and other theorists of a scientific bent argue that the most im-
portant contribution of modern IR theory will be the generation of origi-
nal hypotheses attempting to explain significant features of international
politics. 382 Although deemphasized in this article, the rigorous scientific
approach holds out the remarkable possibility of producing wholly new
knowledge. Modern IR theory is adaptable to such an approach because
of its simplifying assumptions, its deductive logical structure, and its par-
simony. While full empirical testing in the literal sense of the physical
sciences is clearly impossible in international relations, valuable empiri-
cal investigations can still be performed. Perhaps the most fruitful em-
pirical approach would combine third and second image analyses by
exploring how international norms and commitments figure in domestic
decision-making so as to influence the conduct of states.
383
As this summary has shown, the pursuit of modern IR theory would
have a profound effect on IL scholarship. It would permit IL scholars to
join forces with students of international norms and institutions in re-
lated disciplines, after an estrangement of many years; to utilize, along
with their colleagues in the social sciences and law, the powerful analyti-
cal tools of rational actor theory, economics, and game theory; and to
pursue the fruitful lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry just de-
381. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 23, art. IV, 14 U.S.T. at 1219, 480 U.N.T.S. at
49. The subsequent agreements are: (1) Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,
May 26, 1972, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, art. XV, 23 U.S.T. 3435,
3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503; (2) Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, art. VII, para. 3, 23
U.S.T. 3462, 3467, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (Salt I); (3) Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, June 13, 1979, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, art. XIX, para. 3,
S. Exec. Rep. no. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 319, 432, 434 (SALT II); (4) INF Treaty, supra
note 168, art. XV, para. 2, 27 I.L.M. at 97.
382. See, e.g., Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 41, at 27-28.
383. See, e.g., Haggard & Simmons, supra note 18, at 513-17. I have attempted to pursue
this line in an analytical, though not an empirical, way. See Abbott, Trading Nation's Di-




scribed. Modern IR theory could help international lawyers to expand
the bounds of their discipline, to become-in Oran Young's words-
"students of international relations in the true sense of the term, endeav-
oring to shed light on the connecting points of international politics, eco-
nomics, law, and organizations."
384
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